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Abstract 
It has been suggested in the literature that taxes and subsidies play an important role in 
explaining the differences in working hours across countries. In this paper I test whether 
public programmes for family support play a role in explaining this variation. I analyse two 
types of policies: childcare subsidies and family cash benefits. I distinguish between people 
with children and people without children. Childcare subsidies should increase working hours 
in the economy and these effects should differ between people with children and people 
without children. Public support to families is also expected to decrease the amount of time 
people spend in childcare at home. I test this using household data for a set of European 
countries and the US. Empirical analysis, however, does not support the family-policy 
explanation. The effects of the policies on working hours are weak and insignificant. In 
regressions with time spent caring for children as a dependent variable, the estimates of the 
effects contradict the predictions of the theory. Furthermore, I don’t find evidence for the 
expected differences in effects between parents and nonparents. I conclude that family 
policies are not helpful in explaining the variation in working hours across countries.  
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1 Introduction 
There are large differences across countries in the actual hours worked per person. According to 
OECD data, working hours per person are on average about 40% higher in the US than in 
Belgium, Germany or France. Even within Europe itself, differences are substantial; an average 
person in the UK or Scandinavia works almost 30% more than the average person in continental 
Europe. There is large body of research that has tried to explain this variation. One branch of the 
literature explains the “hours divide” with differences in tax rates. Prescott (2004) relies on 
calibration techniques and argues that such a big US-EU gap in working hours can be explained 
almost completely by the higher taxes prevalent in Europe. Olovsson (2004) similarly finds that 
much of the gap between the US and Sweden can be explained by differences in tax rates. 
Estimates in Davis & Henrekson (2004) provide evidence that taxes significantly reduce the 
hours worked. However, while the tax story is plausible when comparing the US with European 
countries, it cannot accommodate the variation in hours within Europe. More specifically, it fails 
to explain the fact that in Scandinavia, despite facing higher taxes, people on average work more 
than in continental Europe. 
In response to this, Ragan (2005) and Rogerson (2007) propose an extension of the simple tax 
story. They argue that it is not only important how big the tax burden is, but also how the 
government uses its tax proceeds. While in the model of Prescott (2004) all taxes are returned 
into the economy as a lump sum subsidy, in reality policies are more complicated in ways that 
are important for the working-hours variation. If taxes are used to support disabled people who 
cannot work, for example, this would increase the differences in hours worked. On the other 
hand, if taxes are used to subsidise day care for children of parents who work, this would 
dampen the effect of taxes on work-hours differences. This extension can thus be used to better 
explain the variation in working hours with respect to Scandinavia, where high taxes coincide 
with a generous system of public provision of family services1. Ragan (2005) and Rogerson (2007) 
expand the model to allow for the service sector that produces childcare and other home care 
services. By means of calibration and simulation they show that accounting for stylised 
                                                 
1
 Rosen (1996) discusses the Swedish case. 
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differences in public policies, including the public provision for household services (i.e. 
childcare), they can much better fit the data on working hours across countries2. 
The purpose of my paper is to identify the role of family policies in explaining working-hours 
variation across countries. Prescott (2004), Ragan (2005) and Rogerson (2007) focus on 
simulations of calibrated macroeconomic models with a representative agent. However, there is 
an underlying logic behind the aggregate effects that they consider. For example, higher 
childcare policies increase aggregate working hours. But the underlying reason for this is that 
with higher childcare support parents are stimulated to work more, therefore they are the ones for 
which we should observe large increases in working hours. In my approach I thus take one step 
back, and look at the underlying logic of the models proposed in the macroeconomic literature. I 
ask who and how is affected by the family policies, and whether evidence of this can be found in 
the data rather then by means of simulation and calibration.  
First, I focus on comparisons of two groups, people with children (parents) and people without 
children (nonparents). Intuitively, family policies should have most of their effects concentrated 
on the recipients: people with (young) children. Second, I focus my attention on two types of 
policies: provision of childcare services by the government (childcare subsidies) and direct cash 
transfers to families (cash benefits). I develop a simple labour supply model with taxes, childcare 
subsidies and family cash transfers and with two types of households: parents and nonparents. 
The two types differ in their utility towards childcare and in their budget constraints due to 
differences in policy receipts. I show that, holding taxes fixed, one would expect a positive effect 
of childcare subsidies and a negative effect of cash benefits on aggregate hours worked in the 
market. Furthermore, effects of each policy on working hours of parents should be stronger than 
effects on working hours of nonparents. Another interesting prediction from the model is 
regarding the effects of family policies on the time spent on childcare at home. Childcare 
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 A similar story is offered in Ngai and Pissarides (2008). They examine the implications of tax and subsidy policies 
for employment in three stylized worlds of welfare: a world with low taxation and low regulation of market work 
(i.e. UK and the US), a world with higher taxation and regulation (i.e. France and Italy), and a world with high 
taxation and regulation, but also with high public support of market services connected with childcare (i.e. Sweden). 
They claim that taxes and subsidies have different effects on market activity in different sectors of the economy, 
depending on how close a substitute the product of a particular sector is to home production. They argue that in this 
way they can explain quite well the differences in employment rates in different sectors between the three worlds of 
welfare. 
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subsidies are expected to decrease aggregate childcare at home, while family cash benefits 
should increase it; the effects are again expected to be stronger for parents.  
If the family-policy explanation of working-hours variation across countries is correct, then the 
above listed predictions should show up empirically. I obtain data on family support policies 
across countries from the OECD Social Expenditure database. In order to distinguish between 
people with children and people without children I use individual level data from the European 
Household Panel (ECHP) and the US CPS, available for the years 1998 - 2001. Due to a short 
time period of available data and due to low variation in policy variables over time, I mostly 
exploit cross-country variation in my analysis.  
Results do not support the idea that family support policies can help explain differences in 
working hours in the economy. In preferred specifications with working hours as a dependent 
variable, the estimated effects for the parents are statistically insignificant and close to zero. 
Whereas in countries with higher childcare subsidies participation in the labour force is higher, 
working hours conditional on working are lower, bringing the aggregate effect of policies to 
zero. In regressions with time spent in childcare at home on the left hand side, the effects of 
policy variables contradict the theory. Analysis performed on the sample of people older than 55 
years, for which family policy should not matter much, gives rise to evidence that in countries 
with stronger family policies, time spent in childcare of older people is shorter. One possible 
explanation for this is that public childcare support actually substitutes for the childcare by older 
people, rather than for the time spent in childcare of the prime-age group. As majority of older 
people do not participate in the labour market, family support thus cannot have a strong impact 
on working hours. 
There could be important cultural differences across countries that my analysis does not capture. 
Therefore I include into the analysis also two measures of “culture”: average number of adults in 
the household and the incidence of part-time work in the country. After controlling for culture, 
aggregate effects of childcare subsidies on working hours become positive and significant; 
however the effects on parents are still weaker than the effects on nonparents. Furthermore, 
results from the analysis on the time in childcare spent at home still contradict the theory. 
Before turning to the paper, it is fair to mention that story of taxes and family-policy is not the 
only story that has been put forward as an explanation of cross-country differences in working 
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hours; on the contrary, the literature is quite large. Faggio & Nickell (2007) have a good 
statistical survey of the differences in working time across countries and they review and discuss 
various explanations. Alesina et al. (2005) rely on the Blanchard & Wolfers (2003) explanation 
that different institutional settings result in different reactions to adverse shocks; i.e. in Europe 
unionisation and labour market regulation increased sharply after the shocks of the 1970s and 
1980s. The shocks resulted in the so called “work-sharing” policies, which can be used to 
explain the low hours worked in Europe. Bell & Freeman (1994, 2001), Freeman & Schettkat 
(2001a) and Schettkat (2003) relate working-hours variation to earnings inequality, where 
earnings inequality increases work effort due to higher incentives. Bowles & Park (2005) also 
focus on inequality, but claim that the positive relationship stems from the fact that social 
comparisons work upwards and hence the poor want to imitate the rich in their consumption. 
Freeman & Schettkat (2001b, 2005) explain the differences between the US and Europe by the 
marketisation hypothesis, stating that households in Europe produce more goods at home than 
the US.  
Another branch of literature that looks more at the macroeconomic aspect of the issue finds 
explanations for differences in working hours across countries and over time in factors such as 
differences in technologies, growth rates and structural transformation (Rogerson (2008, 2006), 
Pissarides (2007)). Related literature focuses on explaining the trends in the US data (McGrattan 
& Rogerson (2004), Greenwood & Vandenbroucke (2005), Aguiar & Hurst (2006), Francis & 
Ramey (2006), Ngai & Pissarides (2007)). Attanasio et al. (2008) try to explain changes in 
female labour force participation in the US within the framework of a life-cycle model. They 
argue that female participation has increased for recent cohorts due to reduced cost of childcare 
and due to rising wages.  
Finally, there is also an extensive literature seeking to assess the microeconomic impacts of 
family-support policies (free/subsidized childcare) on labour market outcomes of families, 
mainly mothers with pre-school children. However, empirical estimates of the effects of these 
policies on the labour supply of mothers have a wide range, from large to insignificant. For some 
examples of this literature refer to Baker et al. (2008), Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008), Gelbach 
(2002), Blau (2000) or Anderson & Levine (1999).  
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The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2 I introduce a simple theoretical model and 
discuss its implications. Section 3 and section 4 show the variation in working hours and the 
variation in public family policies across countries, respectively. In section 5 I undertake 
empirical analysis of the effects of family policies on working hours, distinguishing between 
people with children and people without children. In section 6 I analyze the effects of family 
policies on the time spent in childcare at home. In section 7 I include into the analysis two 
country-level measures of culture and section 8 concludes. 
2 Simple theoretical discussion  
2.1 Basic set-up  
In the theoretical section I show the underlying channels through which family policies affect 
aggregate working hours in the economy. I recognize that public policies treat groups of 
households differently, therefore their contribution to changes in working hours are expected to 
differ too. The model built here is not a general model and the results are specific to the 
assumptions made here, but the exercise is interesting and empirically relevant.  
I introduce a simple model with two types of households and with a government policy that 
supports families. Consider a static economy with two types of households: parents (P) and 
nonparents (N). They are both assumed to have a log-utility function over the consumption of a 
market good (cm), household good (ch) and leisure (l). The market good refers to a composite 
good bought in the market and the household good represents the amount of childcare. Utility 
functions and budget constraints are as follows. 
Parents maximise: 
P
h
P
m
P lcc ln)1(lnln βαβα −−++                                                                                  (1) 
subject to 
sThc PmP ++−= )1( τ                                                                                                       (2) 
gHc P
h
P +=                                                                                                                    (3) 
PPP Hhl −−=1                                                                                                                (4) 
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Nonparents maximise: 
N
h
N
m
N lcc ln)1(lnln γαγα −−++                                                                                  (5)            
subject to 
Thc N
m
N +−= )1( τ                                                                                                            (6)  
N
h
N Hc =                                                                                                                          (7)   
NNN Hhl −−=1                                                                                                              (8)                                                                             
Where  
.γβ >                                                                                                                              (9)                               
τ represents tax wedge3, T is a lump sum subsidy, s represents cash transfers from the 
government to parents and g is public provision of childcare. h represents time worked in the 
market, and H is time spent in childcare at home. α and β are utility parameters on consumption 
and childcare, respectively. All parameters and variables are assumed to be nonnegative and also 
10 << α , 10 << β  and 10 <≤ γ . 
As seen from expressions (1)-(9) parents and nonparents differ in certain important aspects. One 
such difference is in the public policy parameters. Parents receive a cash-transfer s from the 
government (equations (2) and (6)) capturing child allowances and other direct transfers to 
parents that exist in many countries. Time constraints (3) and (7) on ch assume that parents also 
receive a childcare subsidy g from the government. This is assumed to be a perfect substitute for 
home provision of childcare and is provided to the households directly, in kind. There is no 
doubt that this is a simplistic way of entering government support of childcare programmes into 
the model; it assumes that government simply gives each parental household a certain “amount” 
g of childcare. In this model, households have no cost of childcare other than the opportunity 
cost of time, i.e. they don’t need to pay for childcare provided in the market (external day care). 
                                                 
3
 Following Nickell (2004) tax wedge τ incorporates three types of taxes: payroll tax t1, direct taxes on income t2 and 
indirect taxes on consumption t3. This follows from defining a budget constraint for market good 
as httct m )1)(1()1( 123 −−=+ , hence )1(
)1)(1(1
3
21
t
tt
+
−−
−=τ . Although I focus only on the labour supply I incorporate 
the payroll tax t1 in order to capture potentially important effects of this tax on the demand for labour. 
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For alternative specifications, look for example at Ragan (2005) and Rogerson (2007). In their 
models, childcare can be produced either at home or in the market, with these two inputs being 
strong substitutes for each other. When the government subsidizes childcare provided in the 
market, its relative price goes down, and as a consequence individuals spend less time in 
childcare at home and more time at work and in leisure. In my specification, on the other hand, I 
assume that there is no market for childcare. Yet the main mechanism is very similar; with the 
government subsidy g, government takes care of the children instead of the parents, hence they 
are able to work more and enjoy more leisure. While my model is simpler with regards to the 
specification of the government policies, it is more involved in the way that it introduces two 
types of households: parents and nonparents. In aggregate, the main results of the model 
presented here and of the models in Rogerson (2007) and Ragan (2005) go in the same 
direction4. 
Another important difference between nonparents and parents is in their preferences. Condition 
(9) states that parents derive higher utility from consuming ch, which is based on a plausible 
assumption that parents need to spend more time to care for the children. On the other hand, I 
assume that the utility coefficient α  on cm is the same for both types of households. This is done 
for two reasons. First, complicating the model by allowing different utility coefficients on market 
consumption would not add much to answering the questions of interest in this paper. Second, 
note that empirically it is not clear whether parents work more or less than nonparents; in some 
countries they work more while in other countries they work less5. From the assumptions made 
here it therefore follows that differences in working time between parents and nonparents exist 
solely due to differences in treatment of the two groups at the hands of public policy rather than 
due to differences in preferences. 
Households maximise utility with respect to hours of work h and hours in childcare at home H, 
subject to budget and time constraints. See Appendix for first order conditions. Assuming an 
interior solution, the supply of labour is as follows, 
                                                 
4
 I outline an alternative set up with the market for childcare at the end of the Appendix. 
5
 Data on this will be presented later in the paper; see Table 10. Couples normally decide to have children in their 
prime working age and for this reason they tend to work more than other groups. But even if one compares parents 
and nonparents of the same age, while for women it is true that on average those with young children work less, 
most men with children in fact work more. 
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)1(
))(1()1(
τ
α
α
−
+−
−+=
sTghP ,                                                                                      (10)                              
)1(
)1(
τ
α
α
−
−
−=
ThN .                                                                                                        (11) 
Assume that everybody works: 0>h ; this is sensible if we imagine parents and nonparents as 
households, rather than individuals.  
Now I turn to the public sector. Government is assumed to have a balanced budget. Denote the 
percentage of parental households as δ. A government budget constraint can be written as: 
 )())1(( sgThh NP ++=−+ δδδτ .                                                                               (12) 
The left hand side of (12) represents government tax revenues and the right hand side is 
government expenditure on a lump sum subsidy and family policies. The lump sum subsidy T 
will be treated as endogenous, and by combining (10), (11) and (12) can be written as: 
 δτδ
ατ
ττα
sgT −−−
−
−
= )1()1(
)1(
.                                                                                    (13) 
From the expression (13) above it is clear that the more government spends on family support 
policies, given the tax rate, the less remains for the lump sum subsidy. If governments spend 
larger share of their expenditures on family services they do not only support young parents to go 
to work, but they further increase the incentives for work, indirectly, by spending less on the 
lump sum subsidy.  
2.2 Effects of family policy on working hours  
By combining equation (13) with equations (10) and (11) we can get the labour supplies in 
reduced form. 
Labour supply of parents: 
)1(
)1)(1())1(()1(
)1(
τ
δα
αδα
ατ
τα
−
−−
−−++
−
−
= sghP .                                                         (14) 
Labour supply of nonparents: 
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)1(
)1()1()1(
)1(
τ
δα
αδ
ατ
τα
−
−
+−+
−
−
= sghN .                                                                         (15) 
In this model only the supply side of the labour market matters and demand for labour is 
assumed to be perfectly elastic. Therefore, expressions (14) and (15) are the building blocks of 
the discussion about how hours of work (labour supply) react to changes in policy parameters. It 
is also useful to look at the expression for aggregate working hours: 
δ
ατ
ταδδ ghhh NP +
−
−
=−+= )1(
)1()1( .                                                                             (16) 
From (14)-(16) it is clear what determines working hours of households in this model: 
preferences, taxes, childcare subsidies, cash transfers and the share of people with children in 
population. Assume that preferences and population structure remain constant6. It can be easily 
shown that the aggregate labour supply (16) and the labour supply of parents (14) decrease with 
the tax rate7. The same goes for the labour supply of nonparents (15) under plausible conditions. 
The underlying argument behind this result is that higher taxes reduce the marginal benefit from 
working so that households reduce their hours supplied to the market. 
Labour supply is increasing in the amount of childcare subsidy g in all three expressions (14)-
(16), keeping the tax rate constant. It is also straightforward to see from (14) and (15) that the 
effect of the childcare subsidy is stronger for parents. The labour supply of parents increases 
because a higher childcare subsidy g results in more spare time that can be supplied to the 
market. Another channel through which the childcare subsidy g affects working hours is through 
its effect on the lump sum subsidy T. This is also the mechanism through which the childcare 
subsidy affects labour supply of nonparents (15). The government budget constraint (13) dictates 
that the more money government spends on childcare subsidies the less of it is spent on the lump 
                                                 
6
 In this paper I will for most part assume that the share of parents in population is exogenous. However, it is easy to 
argue that it is not exogenous. Cohen et al. (2007) for example report evidence that the introduction of child 
subsidies in Israel increased the fertility of married women with two or more children. In this paper I will not take a 
stand on the direction of causality, hence I will simply report associations between a crude measure of fertility and 
other variables of interest. I will also implicitly assume that the share of parents in population is constant over time 
and across countries. It is indeed slow-moving over time, so the first part does not necessarily generate a huge 
problem, but it is definitely not constant across countries. However, due to endogeneity problems I will leave it out 
of my empirical analysis. Lack of an appropriate instrument leads me to leave this issue for future research.   
7
 Appendix shows this analytically. 
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sums subsidy T, which in turn reduces the non-earned income of households and encourages 
them to work.  
Cash benefits to families s have a negative effect on labour supply of parents (14), but a positive 
effect on labour supply of nonparents (15). The reason for this discrepancy is that, while cash 
benefits increase the non-earned income of parents, they decrease the non-earned income of 
nonparents by lowering the lump sum subsidy T. The latter effect influences both types of 
households but the direct effect of cash benefits dominates for parents. At the aggregate level 
(equation (16)) cash benefits don’t have any effect on the labour supply; the direct effects on the 
labour supply of parents are exactly offset by the indirect effects on the labour supply of both 
groups through the effect on the lump sum subsidy. Effectively, family cash benefit is just a 
redistribution of a subsidy from one group to another, which in aggregate has no effect on 
working hours. 
Another interesting way in which we can look at these results is to compare the working hours of 
parents and nonparents. The expression for the difference is: 
)1(
)1(
τ
α
α
−
−
−=− sghh NP .                                                                                              (17) 
From equation (17) it can be nicely seen that increasing the childcare subsidy while holding the 
tax rate constant increases the working hours of parents relative to the working hours of 
nonparents, and vice versa for the family cash benefits. The tax wedge reduces the work of 
parents relative to nonparents. Now this is a simple model, but it can be intuitively generalised to 
the real economies. In countries with different family policies, this should be reflected when 
comparing the hours worked for parents and nonparents. Suppose we add a stochastic component 
to the above equation (17). In practice, if childcare subsidies g vary across countries more than 
cash benefits s and more than taxes τ, and if in addition s and g are not too strongly correlated, 
then g dominates expression (17). This implies that in the data one would expect to see a positive 
relationship between childcare subsidies and the difference in hours worked between parents and 
nonparents. In countries with high taxes and high childcare subsidies, nonparents are discouraged 
from working due to high taxes, while parents are encouraged to work more due to generous 
childcare subsidies. Hence, according to the model, in such countries, parents should work a lot 
when compared to nonparents. 
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Let me summarize this section. According to the model outlined in this paper, we would expect: 
1) a positive effect of childcare subsidies on aggregate working hours, 2) positive for both 
parents and nonparents, but 3) stronger for parents. There should be 4) no aggregate effects of 
family cash benefits on working hours, 5) the effect should be negative for parents, and 6) 
positive for nonparents. 
2.3 Effects of family policy on childcare at home  
Here I consider the effects of family policies on another use of time – childcare at home. I 
assume that households without children also spend some time in childcare at home, depending 
on the parameter γ . In this way I capture the fact that nonparents also look after children; i.e. 
they spend some time looking after grandchildren, nephews and nieces8. In fact, the time in 
childcare at home of parents and nonparents could also be correlated. If parents go to work while 
members of a nonparent household (i.e. grandparents) look after the children, the time in 
childcare at home of parents is substituted for the time in childcare of nonparents. This kind of 
substitution however is not introduced in my model. The increase in childcare subsidies relieves 
both types of households from childcare. But the effect on nonparents in this model comes solely 
through the effect of the lump sum subsidy T rather than through any direct relationship between 
the time spent in childcare of parents and nonparents. 
In the same way as before we can find reduced form childcare “supply” for parents, nonparents 
and in aggregate.  
Time spent in childcare at home for parents: 
)1(
)1())1(1()1( τ
δβδβ
ατ
β
−
−
+−−−
−
= sgH P .                                                                (18) 
                                                 
8
 In the year 2000 in Europe, for example, individuals with children of age 0-15 in the household on average spent 
21.6 hours per week looking after children, while individuals with no children of age 0-15 in household spent 1.4 
hours per week. The calculation is based on the European Household Panel data for individuals of 16 years of age or 
more. 
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Time spent in childcare at home for nonparents: 
)1()1( τ
γδγδ
ατ
γ
−
−−
−
= sgH N .                                                                                  (19) 
 Aggregate time in childcare at home: 
)1(
)1()())1)((1()1(
)1(
τ
δδγβδγβδ
ατ
δγαβ
−
−−
+−−−−
−
−+
= sgH .                                    (20) 
The results for the time spent in childcare at home basically go in the opposite direction from the 
results for labour supply. All three increase in the tax rate9 as the tax rate reduces the opportunity 
cost of non-work. The childcare subsidy g reduces childcare in all the three expressions (18)-
(20). The cash benefits to families s increase the childcare for parents (18) and in the aggregate 
(20), since by increasing the non-earned income of parents they discourage them from working 
in the market. The cash benefits s, on the other hand, have a negative impact on the childcare of 
nonparents (19), via their effect on the lump sum subsidy T. These effects are naturally stronger 
for parents than for nonparents. 
To summarize, there is 1) a negative effect of childcare subsidies on aggregate time spent in 
childcare at home, 2) negative for both parents and nonparents, but 3) stronger for parents. There 
should be 4) a positive aggregate effect of family cash benefits on childcare time, 5) the effect 
should be positive for parents, and 6) negative for nonparents. 
3 Working hours across countries 
I am interested in explaining the variation of working hours across countries, so it is natural to 
start the empirical investigation by showing what this variation looks like. First I turn to the 
OECD data on total working hours for population of age 15-64. My main analysis is not done 
with the OECD data, but this is the most common source used to report cross-country differences 
in working hours, therefore I report it here. In Table 1 I show hours worked per person per week 
in the year 2000, which I further illustrate in Figure 1. Countries with the highest hours are the 
US (27.1), Canada (24.4) and UK (24.1). Scandinavian countries are mostly in the top half, 
Sweden (23.6), Denmark (23.0) and Finland (22.7); only Norway (21.0) is in the lower half. 
                                                 
9
 Childcare of nonparents decreases with taxes under plausible conditions. See Appendix. 
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Countries with the lowest hours of work are Belgium (18.2), Germany (18.7) and France (18.8). 
Differences across countries are quite large; the difference between the US at the top and 
Belgium at the bottom is nearly 9 hours per week. 
Statistically, differences in working hours can be decomposed into differences in the 
employment rates and differences in the length of the working week for employed persons10. The 
length of the working week takes into account the average hours worked in a week by an 
employed person as well as vacations, public holidays and absences from work. See columns (2) 
and (3) of the Table 1. The employment rates (column (3)) vary from 0.55 in Italy, to 0.79 in 
Norway, a very large difference. Countries like Italy (0.55), Greece (0.57) and Spain (0.58) have 
very low employment rates. This is for most part due to the low participation of women in the 
labour force. The Scandinavian countries, Norway (0.79), Denmark (0.77) and Sweden (0.76), 
the US (0.76) and UK (0.73), on the other hand, have high employment rates. There are also big 
differences in hours worked per week by employed persons (column (2)). Interestingly, hours 
worked per week for employed workers are highest in Greece (40.0), Italy (35.7), the US (35.4) 
and Spain (34.9). For the three southern European countries this is a consequence of the fact that 
due to the low participation of women and older workers, employed persons are mostly prime-
aged males. Hence the statistic on hours worked is based on a sample where most of the subjects 
work full-time, whereas in other countries this statistic is reduced by including many part-time 
employed women and older workers. Countries with lowest hours worked by employed persons 
are Germany (28.2), Belgium (29.7), Denmark (29.9) and France (30.6). The difference between 
the top and the bottom is large: 10 hours per week. In the remainder of the paper I will mainly 
focus on the overall hours worked per person, however in some instances I will also distinguish 
between the employment decision and hours of work decision. 
I now turn to the micro level data obtained from the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP). I combine this with the US March Current Population Survey (CPS) from the IPUMS 
CPS (King et. al. (2004)). Data is available at the individual level for people older than 15 years 
of age at time of survey. To measure working hours I use the variable pe005: Total number of 
hours worked per week (in main + additional jobs). This variable is based on the following two 
survey questions:  “How many hours per week do you work in your main job, including paid 
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 For more thorough analysis see Faggio & Nickell (2007). 
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overtime if any?” and “About how many hours per week did you work in your additional job or 
business? Please give an average figure for the last 4 working weeks.” As this variable is only 
reported for employed individuals, for the rest of the population I assume that they work 0 hours. 
From the US CPS data I use the variable UHRSWORK: Usual hours worked per week (last 
year). This variable reports the number of hours per week that respondents usually worked if 
they worked during the previous calendar year. Individuals were asked this question if they 
reported working at a job or business at any time during the previous year or if they 
acknowledged doing "any temporary, part-time, or seasonal work even for a few days" during 
the previous year.  
These two combined variables capture the “usual” amount of hours worked per week for an 
individual. In this sense they capture whether someone actively participates in the labour market 
or not, and how much this person works in the usual working week. They do not, however, 
incorporate the number of holidays, vacations and days off work. In Figure 2 I show average 
working hours per week for individuals of age 16-64 from this data. I choose the age restriction 
16-64 in order to be comparable with the OECD data on total working hours reported in Table 1. 
Working hours on average appear higher than in the OECD data, the reason being that days off 
work are not counted. Ranking of countries differs from Table 1, but correlation between the 
ranks from the OECD and here is 0.69. Countries with biggest differences in ranks from one data 
set to another are Greece (7 places lower), Belgium, Germany (both 6 places lower) and Spain (5 
places higher)11. 
4 Family support policies across countries  
4.1 Cash benefits and childcare subsidies  
I this section I present data on family support policies. OECD Social Expenditure Data (SOCX) 
provides data on public expenditure on various programmes: old age, survivors, incapacity-
related benefits, health, family, active labour market programmes, unemployment, housing and 
other social policy areas. In what follows I focus on public expenditure under the family 
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 I don’t explore the reasons behind such differences, but I conjecture that they cannot be fully explained by the 
differences in holidays, vacations and days off work. There must be some important differences in data 
methodology. 
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programme. More details about the OECD SOCX can be found in OECD (2007) and in the 
OECD Family Database.  
In Table 2 I show family expenditures as % in GDP across countries for the year 2000. Public 
spending on family benefits can be divided into three groups. First, child related cash transfers 
to families with children, column (1). These include items such as child allowances, public 
income support during parental leave, income support for sole parent families and public 
childcare support through payments to parents. The second group in column (2) is public 
spending on services for families with children. These comprise of direct financing and 
subsidising of providers of childcare and early education facilities, public assistance for young 
people and residential facilities and public spending on family services (centre-based services 
and home help for families in need). The third group shown in column (3) is public support for 
families provided through the tax system, such as tax exemptions, child tax allowances and child 
tax credits. 
For the purposes of the analysis and to be consistent with the model presented in section 2 I 
group these expenditures into two groups:  cash benefits and childcare subsidies, shown on the 
right hand side of Table 2. Cash benefits capture those transfers from the government that 
directly increase the non-earned income of households with children. To obtain a measure of 
cash benefits I combine cash transfers (1) with tax support to families (3). Tax breaks result in 
the reduction of the amount households have to pay in taxes to the government hence they can be 
understood as a cash transfer to families. This is important to recognise, because looking only at 
the cash transfers in column (1) could overstate the actual variation across countries in family 
cash benefits. In the US, for example, direct cash transfers to families are very low, but the tax 
system provides certain benefits to families. On the other hand, in Scandinavian countries there 
is an extensive support to families via cash transfers, but tax reliefs are relatively low.  
However, it is not always clear that tax breaks fall into the category of cash benefits. In some 
countries tax deductions can only be claimed based on the family’s expenses for external 
childcare. In such cases these should perhaps be treated as childcare benefits. With available data 
it is not possible to make such a distinction. Nevertheless, as argued in Immervoll & Barber 
(2005), page 17, support through the tax system blurs the perceived link between childcare 
expenses and support payments. Whereas parents need to pay for childcare today, they get 
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reimbursed through the tax system only after the end of the tax year. Therefore the perceived link 
between expenses and benefits is weakened and tax benefit when received by the family may be 
seen as a windfall rather than a consequence of their childcare choices. The data on tax breaks 
for families is only available for the year 2003, therefore I assume that the ratio of tax breaks 
over cash transfers remains constant over time in a given country12. 
Childcare subsidies capture transfers from the government that provide services to parents and 
effectively act as a substitute for the childcare of parents. Childcare subsidies include public 
spending on pre-primary education which for most countries is available only from the year 
1998. Data on childcare subsidies before that are not comparable across countries. Another issue 
with the reported measure of public support for services to families (column (2) of Table 2) is 
that it includes items such as assistance for pupils and youths, youth centres, family 
accommodation benefits, transport subsidies, holidays for schoolchildren and school meals. 
These do not represent a substitute for the childcare of parents. As much as the information in the 
OECD SOCX dataset allows, I exclude these items from the measure of childcare benefits. I 
consider the new measure of childcare subsidies as a more appropriate one and I use it in the 
analysis that follows. My results are similar regardless of which of the two measures I choose. 
Note also that the correlation coefficient between the two measures is 0.97. 
Let me now turn to the information contained in Table 2. From the last two columns we can see 
that the variation in childcare subsidies is considerably higher than the variation in cash benefits. 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 further illustrate the variation in public child support across countries. 
Childcare subsidies (Figure 3) tend to be especially high in the Scandinavian countries: Denmark 
(2.05%), Norway (1.43%), Sweden (1.30%) and Finland (1.19%)13. Share of childcare subsidies 
in GDP is also very high in France (1.19%). Countries with the lowest share of childcare 
subsidies in the GDP are Ireland (0.00%), Greece (0.15%) and Canada (0.20%). In Figure 4 I 
show family cash benefits, which are the highest in Luxembourg (2.74%), Austria (2.39%) and 
Belgium (2.31%), and the lowest in Spain (0.36%), Italy (0.54%) and Greece (0.74%). 
I now turn my attention to the relationship of the two family support policies with each other. 
Figure 5 plots a scatter diagram of cash benefits and childcare subsidies. There is a weak positive 
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 Time variation in these measures is in general low hence the error thus committed should not be too large. 
13
 This empirical observation was the basis of discussion in the papers by Ragan (2005) and Rogerson (2007). 
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correlation (0.21), not significantly different from zero. Countries can be divided roughly in three 
groups according to the combination of childcare subsidies and cash benefits. The first group 
consists of countries with high childcare subsidies and medium to high level of cash benefits. 
This group comprises of Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland) and 
France. The second group consists of countries with low childcare subsidies but relatively high 
cash benefits: Luxembourg, Belgium, Austria, UK, Germany and Ireland. And lastly, the third 
group consists of countries with low subsidies and low cash benefits: Spain, Italy, Greece, US, 
Portugal, Canada and the Netherlands. 
Another important policy variable in the model presented above is the tax rate. In Figure 6 and 
Figure 7 I therefore show scatter plots of family support policies against the tax wedge. The 
average tax wedge is calculated as explained in the footnote 3, based on the CEP-OECD data on 
labour institutions described in William Nickell (2006). As Greece is not included in the CEP-
OECD data, I calculated the tax wedge directly from the OECD data as explained in Nickell 
(2006). Figure 6 reveals a strong positive relationship between taxes and childcare subsidies 
across countries; the correlation coefficient is 0.66 and statistically significant. Scandinavian 
countries and France stand out as having both high tax rates and high childcare subsidies. The 
US and UK have low tax rates and medium levels of childcare subsidies. On the other hand, 
Figure 7 shows that there is no significantly positive correlation between taxes and family cash 
benefits. In terms of cash benefits, the Scandinavian countries do not stand out. Together these 
two figures suggest a potential for family policies to dampen the effect of taxes on working 
hours. 
4.2 Children in formal care  
In this section I look at the percentage of children enrolled in external childcare and relate it to 
family policies. I do this in order to see whether family policies have effects that one would 
intuitively expect and also to get a feeling whether empirical measures used in this paper are 
informative at all. Childcare subsidies for example directly affect the demand (subsidising fees 
households pay for external care) and the supply of external childcare (public provision of 
childcare-centres or subsidies to childcare providers). Thus childcare subsidies are expected to 
have a strong impact on the proportion of children enrolled in some type of external care. 
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In Table 3 I present data on the use of external childcare, and in Figure 8 I plot the relationship 
between external childcare and childcare subsidies across countries. The first two columns in 
Table 3 show the enrolment rates of children under six in childcare and early education services. 
Data is obtained from the OECD Family Database. Enrolment rates for 0-2 years old concern 
primarily formal childcare arrangements such as group care in childcare centres, registered 
childminders based in their own homes and care provided by a carer at home who is not a family 
member. Enrolment rates for 3-5 years old concern those enrolled in formal pre-school services, 
and, in some countries, 4 and 5 years old in primary schools. Where children are enrolled in 
more than one part-time programme, the issue of double counting arises. This leads to 
overestimated enrolment rates. As a result reported enrolment in some countries can exceed 
100% and the data needs to be interpreted with caution.  
Differences in enrolment rates across countries are large. For 0-2 year olds, enrolment rates 
range from 6.3% in Italy to 61.7% in Denmark. Variation in the enrolment of 3-5 year olds is 
much lower, mainly due to the fact that most children of this age are in some form of pre-school 
service. The lowest enrolment is in Finland (46.1%) and the highest in France (101.9%). The 
data, however, does not account for other important differences in childcare patterns. For 
example, the number of hours children typically spend in formal care varies across countries. 
According to Immervoll & Barber (2005), in some cases, having such information would further 
amplify the observed variation across countries. There are other issues with comparability of the 
data across countries (see OECD Family Database (PF11)). Enrolment rates suffer from 
underreporting in countries where childcare and early education is to a large extent provided by 
the local government (Canada, Ireland and the US); there are also important differences in 
parental leave arrangements across countries (included in the family cash benefits), which 
influence the extent to which children are cared for by external institutions. Countries also differ 
in the availability of informal care by other family members (i.e. grandparents).  
In the last column of Table 3 I report the % of households with at least one child aged 0-11 that 
have their children looked after on a regular basis. Data is based on the ECHP survey question: 
“Are any of the children (0-11) in this household looked after on a regular basis by someone 
other than their parent or guardian, whether at home or outside such as at a crèche or 
kindergarten?” Variation is again very large, ranging form 19.2% of households in Ireland to 
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78.2% of households in Denmark. It is not clear, however, whether the question refers to formal 
or informal child care; answers most probably take into account both types of childcare.  
Figure 8 shows a scatter plot of formal use of childcare versus childcare subsidies. I use two 
different measures of formal use of childcare: enrolment of 0-2 year olds based on the OECD 
data and the % of households with children cared for based on the ECHP. There is a clear 
positive correlation between childcare subsidies and use of external childcare (see also bottom of 
Table 3). Note, however that the use of childcare for children of age 3-5 years is not significantly 
correlated with childcare subsidies. Since in many countries most of the 3-5 year olds are 
enrolled in some form of external care, it is possible that a high share of the observed variation 
for this group is due to measurement error. On the other hand, parents of older children in 
general participate in the labour force more than parents of young children. Hence, intuitively, 
what should matter for the explanation of the hours worked across countries with respect to 
public family policies are the employment and work decisions of parents with very small 
children.    
So far the analysis of the use of external childcare across countries has been descriptive. 
Therefore, in Table 4 I report results from regressing each of the three measures of the use of 
formal childcare on the childcare benefits and the cash benefits. Coefficients in the regression 
with the % of 3-5 years old in formal care (column (2)) are not significant. However, the results 
from regressions with the % of 0-2 year olds in formal care (column (1)) and the % of 
households with children looked after (column (3)) show that the childcare subsidies have a 
strong positive effect on the use of formal childcare. The effects of family cash benefits, on the 
other hand, are not statistically significant. To sum up the discussion in this section, I conclude 
that there is evidence that my measure of childcare subsidies is capturing something sensible, 
and that childcare subsidies have a significant effect on the behaviour of households. 
5 Effects of family support policies on working hours  
5.1 Model calibrations: What is the magnitude of the effects? 
In light of the data on family policies presented above, it would be interesting to check the 
magnitudes of the effects on working hours implied by the model from section 2. The country 
with the highest childcare subsidies, Denmark, devotes 2.05% of its GDP for this measure. Is this 
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high enough to result in a significant effect on aggregate working hours? What about other 
countries, with smaller share of family policies in their GDP? If the implied effects on working 
hours are found to be small, then it is hard to argue that family policies can contribute much to 
explaining differences in working hours across countries. 
Results of this exercise are presented in Table 5. I use the OECD data on working hours and the 
OECD SOCX data on childcare subsidies and cash benefits in order to obtain corresponding 
values for h, τ, g and s (columns (1)-(4)). I use equation (16) with the US data in order to 
calibrate the model for the value of a utility parameter 35.0=α . I use this value for all countries. 
I also use value 39.0=δ  based on the US CPS data for all countries. Columns (5)-(9) of Table 5 
report the % change in working hours implied by the introduction of family policies, based on 
equations (18)-(20). Changes are computed by comparing working hours in two settings: in the 
first setting I set the family policy parameters equal to their actual values, whereas in the second 
setting I set them equal to zero. I report results for 6 cases choosing two countries from each 
group based on Figure 5. Sweden and Denmark represent the high subsidy - high cash benefits 
group, Belgium and UK represent the low subsidy - high cash benefits group, and Italy and US 
represent the low subsidy - low cash benefits group. Note that in all cases, one of the two 
countries has relatively high tax rates and the other one relatively low tax rates. 
On aggregate (column (5)), family policies don’t seem to have a very strong effect on working 
hours. The biggest effect, as expected, is in Scandinavia, where family policy variables increase 
working hours for 2.25% in Denmark and 1.68% in Sweden compared to the situation with no 
family policies, but keeping tax rates constant. In contrast, Ragan (2005) in Tables 1, 5 and 6, 
evaluates corresponding effects to be equal to 16.7% and 25.0%, respectively. Rogerson (2007) 
in Table 6, evaluates that public provision of family services increases working hours by 8.2% 
for Scandinavian levels of policy parameters. Their models, no doubt, are more complex, 
however, they don’t recognise that family policies directly influence only a certain proportion of 
the population14. Furthermore, in their measure of public support to family services they include 
subsidies for elderly care services; this is not justified and overstates the effect of public 
subsidies on working hours. ECHP data for the year 2000 reveal that in Europe persons of age 
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 Ragan (2005) and Rogerson (2006) models also don’t account for the effects of cash benefits. However, in 
aggregate cash benefits don’t have any effect in my model either, as they just redistribute a cash subsidy from one 
group to another. 
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16-55 on average spend 0.7 hours per week looking after a person with special needs without 
pay, while persons older than 55 years spend 1.6 hours per week. Hence this activity does not 
take much time for an average person and furthermore it is concentrated among older people, 
who for most part do not participate in the labour market regardless of public support for 
families. 
In columns (6) and (7) of Table 5 I show effects of family policies on parents. According to my 
model, on average family policies actually reduce working time of parents due to the negative 
effect of cash benefits. This becomes clear after inspecting column (7), where cash benefits are 
set to zero and only the effect of childcare subsidies is considered; the effect on working time is 
positive, especially so for Scandinavian countries. Columns (8) and (9) report effects for 
nonparents. The total effect on this group is quite large, as both subsidies and cash benefits work 
in the same direction (via reducing the lump sum subsidy). However, as expected, when looking 
at the effects of childcare subsidies only, the effects are smaller than for parents. To summarise, 
in the aggregate childcare policies do not seem to have very strong effects on working hours. 
Even for countries with generous public policies such as Scandinavian countries, effects on 
working hours are only around 2%. This does not seem large enough to contribute greatly to the 
explanation of working-hours differences across countries. 
5.2 OECD total working hours and family policy 
I now turn to the empirical analysis of the question whether family policies can explain the 
variation in working hours across countries and whether the effects are in accordance with the 
theory outlined in Section 2. In Table 6 I report regressions of OECD working hours on family 
policy variables and other controls. Due to low variation of policy variables over the short period 
of time, I use cross-sectional variation, with 16 countries included in the analysis. However, to 
increase precision I use a pooled OLS regression over the period 1998-2003; reported standard 
errors are clustered by country. I report three specifications. In column (1) I report a specification 
with childcare subsidies, family cash benefits and the tax wedge on the right hand side only. This 
specification refers to the argument by Prescott (2004) augmented by public policy arguments of 
Ragan (2005) and Rogerson (2007). In the second specification I add the aggregate 
unemployment rate, which accounts for any involuntary unemployment. In the third 
specification, following the empirical analysis in Alesina et al. (2005), Tables 9-10, and Faggio 
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& Nickell (2007), Table 16, I include additional institutional indicators from the CEP-OECD 
dataset: the union density and the employment protection. They control for differences in the 
rigidity and nature of labour markets across countries. Regression analysis throughout this paper 
will be based on these three specifications. 
In column (1) of Table 6 the direction of the coefficients is more or less consistent with the 
theory; childcare subsidies have a significant positive effect, cash benefits have an insignificant 
(negative) effect and taxes have a negative though insignificant effect. However, after including 
more controls in columns (2) and (3) results become by and large insignificant and inconsistent 
with the theory. After including the aggregate unemployment rate, positive effect of childcare 
subsidies becomes insignificant, whereas the negative coefficient in front of cash benefits 
becomes statistically significant. After including union density and employment protection 
measures, all three policy variables are insignificant. The effect of childcare subsides is close to 
zero, the effect of family cash benefits is negative but insignificant, and the effect of tax wedge is 
negative, but too imprecisely measured, hence insignificant. Also all three included controls have 
statistically insignificant coefficient. It appears, therefore, that the OECD data does not have 
enough power to give rise to any firm conclusions on family policies and their role in explaining 
working-hours differences across countries. 
5.3 Regressions of working hours on policy variables  
Let me now turn to the micro level data where I will focus on comparisons of two groups: people 
with children and people with no children. For this I combine data from various sources. Data on 
hours worked together with personal and household characteristics are obtained from the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) and the US March Current Population Survey 
(CPS). The data set includes 15 EU countries and the US. The period of analysis will mainly be 
for the years 1998-2001, where policy variables and household panel data is consistently 
available. Into this individual level data I include country level variables measuring family-
support policies from the OECD Social Expenditure Data (SOCX) and measures of taxes and 
labour market institutions from the CEP-OECD Institutions Dataset (William Nickell (2006)). 
First let me briefly discuss the regression set up. I pool together the whole available period 1998-
2001 in order to increase efficiency. To be on the conservative side, however I cluster standard 
errors by country, despite having multiple observations over time for each country. Main 
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variation exploited in this analysis is thus cross-country variation, with 14 countries15. Due to a 
short period of time and due to slow movement of policy variables over time, I don’t rely on 
fixed effects regressions. I report weighted regressions, using weights as provided in the original 
data sets. However, in order for each country to have the same weight, regardless of the sample 
size, I convert the weights in a way such that summation of weights equals to 1.0 for each 
country in each year. 
In Table 7 I show results from regressing individual working hours on policy variables for 
individuals older than 15 years. All regressions control for age and age squared of the individual. 
Column (1) includes the main three fiscal policy parameters only: the childcare subsidies, the 
family cash benefits and the tax wedge. The results are consistent with the theory. Childcare 
subsidies have a significant positive effect and the tax wedge has a significant and negative 
effect. Family cash benefits have an insignificant effect on working hours. These coefficients, 
however, get knocked down after including the aggregate unemployment rate, as reported in 
column (2). The effects of childcare subsidies still remain statistically significant and positive, 
but the magnitude of the effect is reduced. In column (3) I report my preferred specification with 
unemployment rate and the two measures of the rigidity of labour market institutions. 
Coefficients in front of childcare subsidies and cash benefits are both insignificant. The tax 
wedge has statistically significant negative effect, as expected. The same goes for aggregate 
unemployment rate, which raises my confidence in this specification. Union density has a 
significant positive effect, found also in Faggio and Nickell (2007) and Bowles and Park (2005). 
The effect of employment protection is not statistically different from zero. 
To understand better what is behind this result, I decompose working hours into two 
components: first, the decision whether to participate or not in the labour market, and second, 
how many hours to work per week conditional on participating in the labour market. In Table 8 I 
report three different specifications. “Total effects” specification, where everyone is included in 
the sample, active as well as inactive people, and where working hours are on the left hand side, 
is reported in columns (1) and (4). Results of this specification are equivalent to the results 
reported in columns (1) and (3) of Table 7. In columns (2) and (5) of the Table 8 I report 
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 Only 14 instead of 16 countries are included in the regression analysis because data on tax rates for Ireland and 
Luxembourg are not available. 
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regressions with hours worked conditional on working on the left hand side. Hence, only 
employed people are included. The last specification, in columns (3) and (6), estimates the 
probability of working, with a categorical variable indicating whether an individual is employed 
(= 1) or not (= 0) on the left hand side. Marginal effects from probit regressions are reported. 
An interesting result appears in Table 8. It seems that childcare subsidies are positively 
correlated with participation in the labour market across countries, however, conditional on 
working, in countries with higher childcare subsidies people tend to work shorter weeks. 
Therefore, these two effect cancel each other out, and the total effect of childcare subsidies on 
working hours in column (4), after controlling for other institutional factors, is close to zero and 
statistically insignificant. In the preferred specification of the Table 8 (columns (4) – (6)) the 
effects of family cash benefits are statistically insignificant. While the positive effect of childcare 
subsidies on participation in column (6) is supportive of the theory, the negative effect on 
working hours of employed people in column (5) is inconsistent with the theory. One possible 
explanation is, of course that I am not controlling for other country level characteristics. It is 
possible, for example that in countries with higher childcare subsidies there is higher incidence 
of part-time work, for some unobservable reasons, and that the measure of childcare subsidies is 
simply picking up the effect of this. Another possible explanation is that in countries with higher 
childcare subsidies people tend to work shorter hours due to some unobserved country-level 
characteristic such as culture. I will explore this in more detail in section 7. 
In Table 9 I report analogous analysis, but separately for men and women. Intuitively, one would 
expect that family support policies would have their effects mostly concentrated on women, 
since women are still taking most of the childcare responsibilities within the household. For both 
groups total effects of childcare subsidies on working hours are statistically insignificant, as 
reported in columns (1) and (4). In both cases, again, the effects on hours worked of employed 
people are negative and statistically significant for men, columns (2) and (5), and the effects on 
participation for both groups are positive and statistically significant, columns (3) and (6). 
Effects of family cash benefits are mostly insignificant, except in column (6), where they seem to 
have significantly positive effect on participation of women. Tax wedge has significantly 
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negative effects in regressions for men, but it is too imprecisely measured in the case of 
women16. 
From the results so far I tentatively conclude that there is weak or no evidence that childcare 
subsidies have an effect on working hours in the economy as predicted by the theory. In the next 
section I turn my attention to comparisons of people with and without children. 
5.4 Comparisons of people with and without children  
It is good to first get an idea of the difference in working hours and labour market participation 
between people with children and people without children. I split people into two groups: the 
first group includes people living in households with at least one child of age 0-15 present and 
the second group includes all the rest. Table 10 reports differences across countries between 
parents and nonparents in their working hours and employment rates. It is based on the sample of 
age 16-55. As seen from the table, parents on average work 0.4 hours per week more than 
nonparents, however, there is considerable variation in the differences across countries. In the 
UK, for example, parents work 5.9 hours less than nonparents, while in Sweden they work 6.7 
hours more. Similar conclusions can be inferred from the data on the employment rates, 
calculated from the ECHP and the US CPS data. Again, on average, the employment rate is 2.2 
% points higher for parents. However, in Luxembourg and the UK it is 8.9 and 8.2 % points 
lower, respectively, whereas in Sweden it is 17.0 % points higher. 
I now turn to the regression analysis. Recall from section 2, that we expect positive effects of 
childcare subsidies on working hours of both parents and nonparents, and that these effects are 
expected to be stronger for parents. Similarly, cash benefits are supposed to reduce working 
hours of parents, and increase working hours for nonparents. In absolute value effects of cash 
benefits are expected to be stronger for parents. I report the results in Table 11. In order to 
capture possible differences in the effects of family policies on parents and nonparents I include 
dummy variables (and corresponding interactions) indicating whether children are present in the 
household. In this way I recognize the potential for heterogeneity in the effects of public policies 
across groups of individuals; I allow for heterogeneity in the effects of childcare subsidies, cash 
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 In order to account for a large number of zeroes among the observed hours of work I did the analysis above also 
using Tobit specification. Results were similar. 
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benefits and tax wedge. In columns (1) and (2) of the Table 11 I split people into two groups: 
first group includes everyone with children of age 0-15 in the household, and the second group 
includes everyone else. I report two different specifications, one with policy variables only 
(family policies and taxes) and one with other institutional controls included (unemployment rate 
and labour market rigidities).  
The results in Table 11 do not support the theoretical predictions. Let me focus on my preferred 
specification in column (2). Effects of childcare subsidies for both parents and nonparents are 
insignificant. If anything, effects are stronger for nonparents (as in column (1)). Effects of cash 
benefits are also insignificant. Effects of tax wedge are negative, but statistically significant only 
for nonparents. Intuitively, we would expect the results to be strongest for parents with small 
children. Therefore, in columns (3) and (4) of Table 11 I further split parents into two groups: 
parents with small children (children of age 0-6 in household) and parents with older children 
(children of age 7-15 in household and no younger children). The group with no children is the 
same as in columns (1) and (2). The results are again inconsistent with the theory. Effects of 
family policies in column (4) are small and statistically insignificant for all groups. 
Finally, I report results separately from men and women. I also consider the participation 
decision and working hours’ decision separately. Results are reported in Table 12; I include all 
other institutional controls. Looking at total effects in columns (1) for men, there is evidence of a 
negative and significant effect of childcare subsidies on working hours for male parents and a 
close to zero effect for nonparents. In both cases, participation in the labour market increases 
with the childcare subsidy (column (3)), whereas hours conditional on working decrease with 
childcare subsidies (column (2)).Comparing male parents to male nonparents, the difference in 
the total effects goes in completely wrong direction, as we would expect the effect for parents to 
be more strongly positive. Positive effect of childcare subsidies on participation in column (3) is 
encouraging, but this effect is smaller for male parents than for male nonparents. Total effects of 
cash subsidies for men in column (1) go in the wrong direction; we would expect negative effects 
for parents and positive effects for nonparents but the effects go in the opposite direction. 
Let us now turn to the effects on women. Here the direction of effects is more consistent with the 
theory, but coefficients are very imprecisely measured, hence they are in most cases statistically 
insignificant. Total effects of childcare subsidies in column (4) are positive and stronger for 
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parents, however they are insignificant. For women too, there is a positive effect on participation 
and negative effect on hours worked conditional on working. Effects of childcare subsidies on 
participation (column (6)) are positive and significant, with no real differences between parents 
and nonparents. Total effects of cash benefits for women, column (4) are insignificant, but 
effects at least go in the direction expected in theory: there is a negative effect on working hours 
of female parents. 
To sum up, there is no evidence to support the idea that family policies can help explain 
differences in working hours across countries. In aggregate the effects do not show up 
empirically. There is evidence that childcare subsidies increase participation in the labour 
market, yet in countries with higher childcare subsidies, people who work tend to work fewer 
hours. When comparing parents and nonparents expected differences in effects and magnitudes 
also do not show up. Effects on parents do not seem stronger and in many cases go in the wrong 
direction. If anything, there is some evidence that effects go in the expected direction for 
females. However, these effects are very imprecisely measured and are cancelled out by the 
effects on men. Therefore, they are not enough to be able to explain aggregate differences in 
working hours across countries. 
6 Effects of family-support policies on childcare at home 
It is important to further explore the effects of family support policies. According to the model 
there is another prediction that can be tested in the data. In the way that public support has an 
effect on working hours it also has an effect on the time parents spend in childcare at home. In 
other words, if a mother is encouraged to take up a job, she will likely reduce her time spent in 
childcare. This happens either because the child is put in some form of formal external childcare 
institution, or the child is taken care of informally, by grandparents for example. Hence, in 
theory, a childcare subsidy should reduce the time spent in childcare at home for parents. On the 
other hand, cash benefits should increase the time spent in childcare of parents, as by increasing 
the non-earned income of parents the policy encourages them to stay at home. For people 
without children the effects on childcare are slightly different. Both, childcare subsidies and cash 
benefits are expected to decrease their time spent in childcare at home. This happens via the 
government budget constraint (13); by increasing the support to families, government is reducing 
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the amount of money it awards as a lump sum subsidy, hence nonparents are induced to work 
more and spend less time in other activities. 
Information on the time spent in childcare is based on the ECHP variable pr007: Number of 
hours (per week) spent looking after children. This variable is based on two related survey 
questions: “Do your present daily activities include looking after children, whether your own or 
other, without pay?” and if the answer to this question is yes, “Roughly how many hours per 
week do you spend looking after children?” This variable is reported for those who did spend 
some time looking after children. For the rest (if applicable) I assume they spend 0 hours looking 
after children. This variable is not available for the US and also not for Germany, Sweden, the 
UK and Luxembourg. In Table 13 I show a comparison between childcare at home for people 
with and without a child of age 0-15 in household. There exists a very large variation across 
countries in the time spent in childcare at home and there is also large variation in the differences 
in childcare time between the two types of individuals. People with children spend 31.4 hours 
looking after children in Denmark, but only 13.9 hours in Portugal. On the other hand, people 
without children spend 0.7 hours per week looking after children in Denmark, France or Spain 
and 3.22 hours in Italy. On average parents spend 20.2 hours more in childcare at home than 
people without children. This difference is highest in Denmark (30.7), Netherlands (28.9) and 
Ireland (27.9) and lowest in Portugal (13.0), Italy (15.7), Greece (16.0) and France (16.1) In 
general, south European countries such as Portugal, Greece and Italy tend to have low 
differences, indicating that there may be a lot of informal care for children going on, i.e. by 
grandparents. 
In Table 14 I report regression results from regressing the hours looking after children on the 
policy variables. As for quite a few countries the data on childcare is not available, only 10 
countries are left for this analysis. Because of this the results of this section cannot be directly 
comparable to the results from the previous section, where I analysed the effects of policies on 
working hours. Let’s first look at the results reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 14 where I 
report regression on the whole sample with institutional controls either excluded or included, 
respectively. In aggregate, childcare subsidies are expected to decrease time in childcare at 
home, whereas cash benefits are expected to increase time in childcare. The empirical results 
however, are not consistent with this. In the specification with other controls included, column 
(2), effect of childcare subsidies is statistically insignificant, but positive. Effect of cash benefits 
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on the other hand is significantly negative. In columns (3) and (4) I do analogous analysis, but 
allowing for differential effects between parents and nonparents. Recall that effect of childcare 
subsidies is expected to be more negative for parents, whereas the effect of family cash benefits 
is supposed to be positive for parents and negative for nonparents. This is not the case in my 
results. Effects of childcare subsidies on parents are in fact positive and significant, whereas for 
nonparents they are negative and significant. This means that in countries with higher childcare 
subsidies parents appear to take more care of children at home! The only statistically significant 
effect that goes in the right direction is the effect of cash subsidies on nonparents in column (4). 
Finally, in columns (5) and (6) I split the sample by gender, and again results are inconsistent 
with the theory for both males and females. 
In order to better understand what is behind these results I next split the sample by age. Into one 
group I put people of age 16-55 and in the second group I put people that are older than 55 years. 
I choose the 55 years cut-off, because this is about the average age at which people become 
grandparents. I report the results in Table 15. In columns (1) and (2) I report results for the 
sample of age 16-55. Similarly as before, there is a puzzling positive effect of childcare subsidies 
on time in childcare activities at home and a negative effect of cash benefits, column (1); both 
these effects are inconsistent with the predictions of the theory. Comparing parents and 
nonparents, effects of childcare subsidies are strongly positive for parents, which is also 
puzzling. Moving to column (3) where I show results from the analysis on people of age 56 or 
more, we can see significant and negative effects of both types of family policy on their time in 
childcare at home. There seems to be some indication that family policies do not have expected 
effects on the prime-age group, or on parents, but there seem to be strong and significant effects 
on old people, for example grandparents. One potential explanation for this would be that if 
family policies are not relieving the childcare burden of parents, perhaps they are merely 
relieving the childcare burden of grandparents. Therefore, since grandparents are often not active 
in the labour market, effects on working hours cannot be large. However, there may be certain 
cultural or institutional unobservables that are correlated with family policy variables and thus 
contaminating the results. I try to look into that in the next section.   
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7 Controlling for the effects of “culture” 
In a cross-country analysis there is always a risk of unobservable country level variables that are 
correlated with observed regressors contaminating the results. My analysis is very much prone to 
this kind of bias. I have discussed above that it is possible that cultural aspects affect my results 
and bias the coefficients on family policy variables. For example, in section 5.3 I report that 
conditional on working, childcare subsidies have a negative effect on working hours. However, it 
could as well be the case that in countries with high public childcare support part-time work is 
more prevalent. Furthermore, I also find that childcare subsidies have positive effect on time in 
childcare at home by parents. This result, however could be caused by the fact that in countries 
with lower childcare subsidies such as southern Europe, parents take less time to care for their 
children, because to them using informal care by other family members is more readily available 
and more acceptable. The reported effect could thus appear merely due to differences in culture 
across countries that are correlated with the measure of childcare subsidies. 
In order to assess the impact of these two effects I include into the analysis two more variables. 
First is measuring the prevalence of part time work in a country, and the second is measuring the 
average number of adults in a household. Both variables are calculated from the information 
available in the ECHP and the US CPS. In Table 16 I show these two variables across countries 
for the year 2000. Share of part-time workers measures the percentage of employed people that 
are employed part-time. The share of part-time workers is partly determined by institutional 
arrangements in the labour market, and partly by preferences of consumers/households. As seen 
from Table 16, 13% of workers are on average employed part-time17, but differences across 
countries are very large. In Netherlands, for example 31.2% employed people work part-time. 
This is followed by Ireland (19.1%) and the US (17.5%). At the bottom end of the spectrum are 
southern European countries, Greece (5.5%), Italy (6.9%) and Portugal (7.8%). 
Another variable is measuring the average number of adults of age 18 or more in a household. 
With this measure I am trying to capture cultural differences across countries regarding the 
family size, living arrangements and proximity of a potential informal care for children. 
Unweighted average of the number of adults in the household across countries is equal to 2.0. As 
                                                 
17
 Based on unweighted cross-country average. 
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expected, the biggest size of households is observed in southern Europe: Spain (2.6), Portugal 
(2.5), Greece and Italy (both 2.3). Ireland also has a high average number of adults (2.3) in a 
household. At the lower end of the scale are countries such as Sweden (1.6), Finland (1.7), 
Netherlands (1.8) and the UK (1.8). 
The first set of regression results is reported in Table 17. I repeat the analysis from before, only 
that now I include also the two new measures of “culture”. Let me first briefly talk about the 
effects of variables measuring culture. They seem to have significant effects in most of the 
specifications. Incidence of part time work enters with a negative and significant coefficient in 
all six specifications, as expected. Similarly, the average number of adults has a negative and 
significant effect in 4 out of 6 cases, also something in line with the intuition. In countries with 
larger families, people tend to work less on average, mainly due to lower participation in the 
labour market. 
Columns (1)-(3) of Table 17 are analogous to the columns (4)-(6) in Table 8. They analyse the 
aggregate effects of family policies on working hours in the economy, decomposed into the 
participation and hours of work decision. First, with culture included in the regression there is a 
positive and significant total effect of childcare subsidies on working hours, column (1). In 
column (2), despite including the measure of the incidence of part-time work into the regression, 
there is still a significantly negative, but smaller than before, effect of childcare subsidies on 
working hours conditional on working. Hence, this effect seems to be quite robust. In column (3) 
the effect of childcare subsidies on participation is more or less the same as before. The effects of 
cash benefits on working hours are insignificant on aggregate. These results tend to be 
supportive of the theory, and hence indicate a possibility that after controlling for differences in 
household size and incidence of part-time work, family policies have a scope to explain 
differences in working hours across countries. 
However, when comparing parents with nonparents differences remain puzzling, and contradict 
the theory. Columns (4)-(6) in Table 17 show the results of this exercise. Effects of childcare 
subsidies tend to be stronger for nonparents rather than parents, and the effects of cash benefits 
are all insignificant. Results remain inconsistent with the theory also when analysing the time in 
childcare at home, reported in Table 18 (analogous to results reported in Table 15). One can see 
that incidence of part-time work and the size of households have strong and significant positive 
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effects on childcare at home, however, this does not prevent coefficients on family policies from 
being “wrong”. On aggregate, in column (1), childcare subsides still tend to have a positive and 
significant effect on childcare at home. When comparing parents and nonparents in column (2), 
the difference in coefficients is still counterintuitive, as the effect on parents is, contrary to 
expectations, significantly positive. And when analysing effects on old people, the negative 
effects of childcare subsidies and cash benefits are reduced after the inclusion of the measures of 
culture, but remain negative and highly statistically significant. This confirms the idea that 
family policies relieve the childcare burden of nonparents rather than parents. 
8 Conclusion 
In this paper I test whether fiscal family-support policies can help explain the differences in 
working-hours across countries. This has been suggested in the literature by Rogerson (2007) 
and Ragan (2005), but has so far relied on simulations of stylised macroeconomic models with a 
representative agent. However, the proposed explanations imply some important effects at a 
more disaggregated level. I therefore focus on differences between people with children and 
people without children.  
I consider two types of public family policies: childcare subsidies and family cash benefits. With 
a simple theoretical model I show that we would expect 1) a positive effect of childcare subsidies 
on aggregate working hours, 2) positive for both parents and nonparents, but 3) stronger for 
parents. There should be 4) no aggregate effects of family cash benefits on working hours, but 5) 
the effects should be negative for parents, and 6) positive for nonparents. Effects of family 
policies are also expected to have effect on the time in childcare within a household. According 
to the model outlined in this paper there is 1) a negative effect of childcare subsidies on 
aggregate time spent in childcare at home, 2) negative for both parents and nonparents, but 3) 
stronger for parents. There should be 4) positive aggregate effects of family cash benefits on 
childcare time, 5) the effects should be positive for parents, and 6) negative for nonparents. 
I test these predictions using cross country variation from European Household Panel and the US 
CPS data. In the aggregate setting there is no supportive evidence for the idea that family 
policies help explain differences in working hours across countries. In preferred specifications 
with other controls included, effects are close to zero and insignificant. In countries with higher 
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childcare subsidies, participation in the labour force is indeed higher, but working hours 
conditional on working are lower, bringing the aggregate effect of policies to zero. When 
comparing the effects of parents and nonparents, the differences in the coefficients are 
counterintuitive. There is an indication that results go in the right direction for females, but are 
cancelled out by the counter effects on males, hence, in the aggregate setting, family policy do 
not have the expected effect on working hours. 
Furthermore, in regressions with the time spent in childcare at home on the left hand side, the 
effects of policy variables contradict the theory. Childcare subsidies, for example, seem to 
increase the time in childcare at home and this effect seems to be, counter-intuitively, strongest 
for parents. Analysis performed on the sample of people older than 55 years, for which family 
policy should not matter much, seems to indicate that family policies tend to reduce the time in 
childcare for this group. One possible explanation for this is that public childcare support 
actually relieves grandparents from childcare, rather than parents. But, since older people do not 
participate in the labour market very much, family support cannot have a strong impact on 
working hours. Finally, I include into the analysis two measures of “culture”: average number of 
adults in the household and the incidence of part-time work in the country. After controlling for 
these two variables, aggregate effects of childcare subsidies on working hours become positive 
and significant; however the effects on parents are still weaker than the effects on nonparents and 
results from the analysis on the time in childcare spent at home still contradict the theory.  
The lack of empirical evidence in support of the idea that family policies can help explain the 
differences in working hours across countries is striking. The family policy story can perhaps be 
used narrowly to explain the differences between Sweden and the US, but it does not bear the 
inclusion of a greater set of countries and a greater set of controls. Nor does it bear the separation 
of effects for parents and nonparents. I hence conclude that the family policy story contributes 
little to the explanation of the differences in working hours across countries. 
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Table 1: Working hours per week per person 15-64 (year 2000) 
 (1) = (2)*(3) (2) (3) 
Country 
Hours per 
week per 
person 
Hours per 
week 
(employed) 
Employment 
rate 
Austria 21.58 31.38 0.69 
Belgium 18.22 29.71 0.61 
Canada 24.43 33.97 0.72 
Denmark 23.01 29.88 0.77 
Finland 22.68 33.64 0.67 
France 18.82 30.62 0.61 
Germany 18.70 28.23 0.66 
Greece 22.96 40.00 0.57 
Ireland 21.36 32.46 0.66 
Italy 19.52 35.67 0.55 
Luxembourg 19.87 31.52 0.63 
Netherlands 19.11 26.31 0.73 
Norway 21.01 26.54 0.79 
Portugal 23.64 32.52 0.73 
Spain 20.18 34.91 0.58 
Sweden 23.62 31.24 0.76 
United Kingdom 24.11 32.85 0.73 
United States 27.06 35.40 0.76 
Data sources: OECD data on total working hours. Data are for the population of 15-64 years of age. Working hours 
per week per person (1) is the product of employment rate (3) and weekly hours of employed persons (2). Weekly 
hours of employed take into account the length of the working week as well as holidays and other days off work. 
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Table 2: Public family spending, % GDP (year 2000) 
 
(1) (2) (3)  = (1) + (3) ≈* (2) 
country Cash Services 
Tax 
breaks 
 Cash 
benefits 
Childcare 
subsidies 
Austria 2.37 0.56 0.02  2.39 0.34 
Belgium 1.76 0.83 0.55  2.31 0.59 
Canada 0.77 0.20 0.08  0.85 0.20 
Denmark 1.49 2.19 0.00  1.49 2.05 
Finland 1.70 1.35 0.00  1.70 1.19 
France 1.47 1.54 0.77  2.24 1.19 
Germany 1.16 0.78 1.01  2.16 0.40 
Greece 0.74 0.39 0.00  0.74 0.15 
Ireland 1.64 0.19 0.07  1.71 0.00 
Italy 0.54 0.61 0.00  0.54 0.55 
Luxembourg 2.74 0.48 0.00  2.74 0.47 
Netherlands 0.72 0.73 0.44  1.17 0.73 
Norway 1.87 1.93 0.12  1.99 1.43 
Portugal 0.65 0.43 0.17  0.83 0.31 
Spain 0.30 0.56 0.06  0.36 0.40 
Sweden 1.52 1.74 0.00  1.52 1.30 
United Kingdom 1.87 0.71 0.31  2.18 0.56 
United States 0.11 0.63 0.83  0.94 0.38 
Average 1.30 0.88 0.25  1.55 0.68 
Coefficient of variation 0.56 0.67 1.32   0.47 0.79 
Data sources: OECD Social Expenditure database (SOCX 1980-2003) and OECD Family Database (PF1). Columns 
(1)-(3) are as reported in the data sources; columns on the right hand side are as shown. Cash transfers to families 
(1) include items such as child allowances, public income support during parental leave, income support for sole 
parent families and public childcare support through payments to parents. Services (2) comprise of direct financing 
and subsidising of providers of childcare and early education facilities, public assistance for young people and 
residential facilities, public spending on family services (centre based services and home help for families in need). 
Tax breaks (3) represent tax exemptions, child tax allowances and child tax credits.  
Childcare subsidies exclude those services that do not support childcare; such items include for example assistance 
for pupils and youths, youth centres, family accommodation benefits, transport subsidies, holidays for 
schoolchildren, school meals etc. 
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Table 3: Use of formal childcare 
 OECD Family Database  ECHP  
 
Enrolment rates of 
children under six in 
childcare and early 
education services 
(2003/04) 
 % of households 
having their kid 
looked after on a 
regular basis 
(2000) 
Country 0 - 2 years 3 - 5 years  0-11 years 
Austria  6.6 74.0  33.0 
Belgium  33.6 99.6  43.7 
Canada 19 na  na 
Denmark  61.7 89.7  77.4 
Finland  35 46.1  46.6 
France  28 101.9  42.7 
Germany  9 80.3  38.1 
Greece  7 46.8  21.0 
Ireland  15 68.2  19.2 
Italy 6.3 100.3  33.8 
Luxembourg  14 72.3  55.0 
Netherlands  29.5 70.2  29.3 
Norway  43.7 85.1  na 
Portugal 23.5 77.9  45.7 
Spain  20.7 98.6  20.0 
Sweden  39.5 86.6  66.4 
United Kingdom  25.8 80.5  34.9 
United States  35.5 62.0  na 
Correlation with 
childcare subsidies 0.83* 0.28  0.81* 
Data sources: OECD Family Database (PF11). Canada and Germany (2001); France (2002); Greece, Luxembourg 
and Norway (2003); Denmark and the United States (2005). Enrolment rates for 0-2 years old concern primarily 
formal childcare arrangements such as group care in childcare centres, registered childminders based in their own 
homes and care provided by a carer at home who is not a family member. Enrolment rates for 3-5 years old concern 
those enrolled in formal pre-school services, and in some countries 4 and 5 years old in primary schools. Where 
children are enrolled in more than one part-time programme, the issue of double counting arises. This leads to 
overestimated enrolment rates (enrolment in some countries > 100%). 
ECHP (European Community Household Panel), year 2000. Calculations based on the survey question at the level 
of household: “Are any of the children (0-11) in this household looked-after on a regular basis by someone other 
than their parent or guardian, whether at home or outside such as at a crèche or kindergarten?” Based on all 
households with at least one child aged 0-11. 
* denotes significantly different from zero at 5%. 
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Table 4: Relationship between the use of formal childcare and family policy variables (year 
2000) 
Dependent variable: % aged 0-2 in care % aged 3-5 in care 
% households with 
kids looked after+ 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Childcare subsidies - % GDP 23.647 8.748 23.657 
 
(4.022)*** (8.251) (3.268)*** 
Family cash benefits - % GDP -2.261 0.430 3.877 
 
(2.996) (6.175) (2.502) 
Constant 12.628 71.956 17.139 
 
(5.288)** (11.406)*** (5.508)*** 
Observations 18 17 59 
R-squared 0.70 0.08 0.75 
Standard errors in parentheses, +pooled OLS: period 1998-2001, standard errors clustered by country, 
with 15 clusters. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
  
Table 5: Calibration of the model: magnitude of the effects of family policies on working 
hours 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
     Aggregate Parents Nonparents 
Country h τ g s 
effect of 
including g 
and s 
effect of 
including 
g and s 
effect of 
including 
g only 
effect of 
including g 
and s 
effect of 
including 
g only 
Sweden 0.24 0.58 0.0080 0.0094 1.68% -2.16% 2.61% 4.15% 1.09% 
Denmark 0.23 0.50 0.0123 0.0090 2.25% 0.17% 3.49% 3.59% 1.46% 
Belgium 0.19 0.49 0.0028 0.0110 0.50% -3.09% 0.78% 2.81% 0.33% 
UK 0.25 0.34 0.0035 0.0137 0.52% -2.29% 0.81% 2.32% 0.34% 
Italy 0.20 0.50 0.0028 0.0028 0.52% -0.23% 0.80% 1.00% 0.34% 
US 0.28 0.30 0.0027 0.0067 0.38% -0.77% 0.59% 1.13% 0.25% 
Time frame for calculations of h is 14 hours a day (as in Ragan (2005) and Prescott (2004)), 
)7*14/()hours  workingOECD(=h . Policy parameters are based on data sources described above (OECD, OECD 
SOCX). In the model h represents the value of the whole economy (= gdp), hence the real value of what government 
gives for childcare subsidies is *htotg GDP) % as subsidies childcare(= . This only goes to parents, 
hence δ/totgg = . s is calculated in the same way. 
In calculations I compare values for h in the model where g (and s) is set to their actual values, with h from the 
model where g and s are set to zero, based on equations (14)-(16). I set 35.0=α , calibrated from the US data using 
equation (16), and 39.0=δ , calculated from the US CPS. 
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Table 6: OECD total working hours and family policy: regression analysis (1998-2003) 
Dependent variable: Working hours per week 
 (1) (2) (3) 
childcare subsidies - % GDP 1.892 1.152 0.199 
 (0.983)* 
 
(0.836) (1.070) 
family cash benefits - % GDP -1.018 -1.414 -1.344 
 (0.784) 
 
(0.702)* (0.779) 
tax wedge -17.363 -9.553 -8.080 
 (11.640) 
 
(11.364) (11.912) 
unemployment rate  -0.295 -0.200 
  (0.167)* (0.171) 
union density   0.033 
   (0.039) 
employment protection   -3.544 
   (2.411) 
Constant 29.079 28.874 29.499 
 (4.907)*** (5.116)*** (3.955)*** 
Observations 82 80 63 
No. of clusters/countries 16 15 15 
R-squared 0.25 0.34 0.55 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country), * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 7: Working hours and family policy: regressions on the sample of age 16 and more 
(1998-2001) 
Dependent variable: Working hours per week 
 (1) (2) (3) 
childcare subsidies - % GDP 2.633 1.443 0.413 
 (0.972)** 
 
(0.792)* (0.925) 
family cash benefits - % GDP 0.664 -0.078 -0.098 
 (0.868) 
 
(0.743) (0.566) 
tax wedge -24.792 -12.232 -29.249 
 (9.996)** 
 
(8.314) (10.652)** 
unemployment rate  -0.450 -0.297 
  (0.172)** (0.150)* 
union density   0.084 
   (0.026)*** 
employment protection   0.190 
   (2.793) 
age 1.779 1.772 1.777 
 (0.144)*** (0.151)*** (0.151)*** 
age^2 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Constant 3.110 3.082 6.884 
 (5.426) (5.136) (4.807) 
Observations 829502 810698 810698 
No. of clusters/countries 14 13 13 
R-squared 0.26 0.27 0.27 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country), * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 8: Participation, working hours of employed people and family policy: regressions on 
the sample of age 16 and more (1998-2001) 
Dependent variable: Working hours per week Employed 
dummy 
 Working hours per week Employed 
dummy 
Sample: all employed  all  all employed all 
 OLS Probit+  OLS Probit+ 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
childcare subsidies - % GDP 2.633 -2.711 0.159  0.413 -2.412 0.130 
 (0.972)** 
 
(0.889)*** (0.029)***  (0.925) (1.036)** (0.030)*** 
family cash benefits - % GDP 0.664 -0.462 0.049  -0.098 -0.063 0.025 
 (0.868) 
 
(0.552) (0.024)**  (0.566) (0.576) (0.016) 
tax wedge -24.792 12.735 -1.085  -29.249 -4.074 -0.526 
 (9.996)** 
 
(7.597) (0.256)***  (10.652)** (10.387) (0.327) 
unemployment rate     -0.297 0.240 -0.014 
     (0.150)* (0.174) (0.003)*** 
union density     0.084 0.045 -0.001 
     (0.026)*** (0.029) (0.001) 
    0.190 0.986 -0.010 employment protection 
    (2.793) (2.646) (0.070) 
age 1.779 1.042 0.061  1.777 1.046 0.060 
 (0.144)*** (0.162)*** (0.014)***  (0.151)*** (0.163)*** (0.014)*** 
age^2 -0.022 -0.012 -0.001  -0.022 -0.012 -0.001 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.000)***  (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.000)*** 
Constant 3.110 16.064   6.884 18.393  
 (5.426) (4.708)***   (4.807) (4.763)***  
Observations 829502 515589 842056  810698 507171 823200 
No. of clusters/countries 14 14 14  13 13 13 
R-squared 0.26 0.04 0.25  0.27 0.04 0.25 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country), + Marginal effects reported (evaluated at the mean of the 
independent variables), * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 9: Participation, working hours of employed people and family policy: regressions 
for males and females on the sample of age 16 and more (1998-2001) 
Gender group: Males  Females 
Dependent variable: Working hours per week Employed 
dummy 
 Working hours per week Employed 
dummy 
Sample: all employed  all  all employed all 
 OLS Probit+  OLS Probit+ 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
childcare subsidies - % GDP -0.429 -2.439 0.101  1.228 -2.114 0.150 
 (0.670) 
 
(0.590)*** (0.013)***  (1.461) (1.622) (0.049)*** 
family cash benefits - % GDP -0.176 0.737 0.004  -0.021 -0.932 0.044 
 (0.298) 
 
(0.419) (0.008)  (0.891) (0.998) (0.023)* 
tax wedge -31.559 -14.615 -0.434  -26.449 6.131 -0.591 
 (6.366)*** 
 
(7.737)* (0.148)***  (17.501) (18.347) (0.516) 
unemployment rate -0.265 0.192 -0.013  -0.329 0.253 -0.016 
 (0.109)** (0.111) (0.002)***  (0.219) (0.285) (0.005)*** 
union density 0.069 0.057 -0.001  0.092 0.040 -0.000 
 (0.015)*** (0.020)** (0.000)***  (0.045)* (0.052) (0.001) 
0.673 1.672 -0.009  -0.320 -0.102 -0.011 employment protection 
 (1.520) (1.508) (0.044)  (4.286) (4.732) (0.094) 
age 2.621 1.349 0.074  1.084 0.697 0.046 
 (0.123)*** (0.178)*** (0.013)***  (0.200)*** (0.203)*** (0.014)*** 
age^2 -0.032 -0.015 -0.001  -0.015 -0.009 -0.001 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.000)***  (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.000)*** 
Constant -2.408 18.257   13.401 19.425  
 (3.663) (4.646)***   (6.581)* (5.877)***  
Observations 387639 274370 393591  423059 232801 429609 
No. of clusters/countries 13 13 13  13 13 13 
R-squared 0.34 0.07 0.32  0.23 0.03 0.22 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country), + Marginal effects reported (evaluated at the mean of the independent 
variables), * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 10: Comparisons of people with and without children: working hours and 
employment rates for the sample of age 16-55 (year 2000) 
 Working hours  % employed 
Country 
Children 
(0-15) 
present 
No 
children 
(0-15) 
present Difference 
 
Children 
(0-15) 
present 
No 
children 
(0-15) 
present Difference 
Austria 31.8 32.9 -1.1  80.6 80.4 0.2 
Belgium 30.2 26.4 3.8  77.2 65.8 11.4 
Denmark 33.0 31.3 1.7  86.5 85.4 1.2 
Finland 33.2 29.4 3.8  80.9 73.2 7.6 
France 26.4 24.2 2.3  71.4 65.6 5.8 
Germany 28.1 31.6 -3.5  75.6 80.5 -4.9 
Greece 29.4 25.2 4.2  66.8 59.1 7.7 
Ireland 24.9 27.5 -2.6  66.9 71.6 -4.7 
Italy 25.4 23.0 2.4  65.1 58.1 7.0 
Luxembourg 27.8 32.2 -4.4  75.9 84.8 -8.9 
Netherlands 25.3 28.4 -3.1  79.6 81.4 -1.8 
Portugal 33.8 30.2 3.7  79.8 72.1 7.7 
Spain 24.6 23.8 0.8  58.7 57.3 1.4 
Sweden 33.9 27.1 6.7  85.7 68.7 17.0 
United Kingdom  28.2 34.1 -5.9  75.0 83.2 -8.2 
United States  31.7 33.7 -2.1  81.0 84.4 -3.4 
Average 29.2 28.8 0.4  75.4 73.2 2.2 
Data Sources: ECHP and IPUMS CPS (King et. al. (2004)). 
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Table 11: Working hours and family policy for people with and without children: 
regressions on the sample of age 16 and more (1998-2001) 
Dependent variable: Working hours per week 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Effects of childcare subsidies 
people with children 0-15 2.252 0.142   
 (1.437) (1.169)   
people with children 0-6   1.724 -0.371 
   (1.389) (1.008) 
people with children 7-15   2.753 0.673 
   (1.725) (1.580) 
people without children 0-15 2.827 0.446 2.827 0.451 
 (0.794)*** 
 
(0.917) (0.794)*** (0.914) 
Effects of family cash benefits 
people with children 0-15 0.749 0.025   
 (1.208) (0.831)   
people with children 0-6   0.387 -0.206 
   (1.252) (0.880) 
people with children 7-15   1.025 0.204 
   (1.326) (1.036) 
people without children 0-15 0.590 -0.236 0.590 -0.234 
 (0.763) 
 
(0.538) (0.763) (0.538) 
Effects of tax wedge 
people with children 0-15 -9.361 -12.216   
 (12.684) (12.846)   
people with children 0-6   -6.196 -9.433 
   (12.128) (12.037) 
people with children 7-15   -12.288 -15.068 
   (14.611) (15.205) 
people without children 0-15 -31.326 -35.386 -31.326 -35.464 
 (9.762)*** 
 
(10.631)*** (9.762)*** (10.562)*** 
children 0-15 in household dummy -2.085 0.944   
 (5.734) (5.310)   
children 0-6 in household dummy   -2.346 0.547 
   (5.253) (4.919) 
children 7-15 in household dummy   -1.735 1.455 
   (6.669) (6.271) 
no 0-15 children in household dummy 5.595 9.659 5.590 9.675 
 (5.458) (4.690)* (5.448) (4.676)* 
age 1.752 1.751 1.752 1.750 
 (0.136)*** (0.142)*** (0.136)*** (0.142)*** 
age^2 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
unemployment rate  -0.302  -0.300 
  (0.150)*  (0.150)* 
union density  0.083  0.083 
  (0.026)***  (0.026)*** 
employment protection  0.004  0.012 
  (2.824)  (2.810) 
Observations 829040 810236 829040 810236 
No. of clusters/countries 14 13 14 13 
R-squared 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country), * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
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Table 12: Participation, working hours of employed people and family policy for people 
with and without children: regressions for males and females on the sample of age over 16 
(1998-2001) 
Gender group: Males  Females 
Dependent variable Working hours per week Employed 
dummy 
 Working hours per week Employed 
dummy 
Sample: all employed  all employed 
 OLS Probit+  OLS Probit+ 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Effects of childcare subsidies 
people with children 0-15 -1.748 -2.170 0.069  2.178 -1.491 0.147 
 (0.517)*** (0.609)*** (0.016)***  (1.896) (2.062) (0.032)*** 
people without children 0-15 0.130 -2.617 0.109  0.680 -2.629 0.152 
 (0.658) 
 
(0.573)*** (0.018)***  (1.574) (1.512) (0.065)** 
Effects of family cash benefits 
people with children 0-15 0.727 1.053 0.009  -0.500 -2.123 0.031 
 (0.287)** (0.354)** (0.014)  (1.466) (1.486) (0.029) 
people without children 0-15 -0.601 0.529 0.001  0.053 -0.291 0.049 
 (0.316)* 
 
(0.466) (0.009)  (0.840) (0.827) (0.027)* 
Effects of tax wedge 
people with children 0-15 -15.825 -18.051 -0.025  -11.074 12.227 -0.280 
 (6.052)** (7.541)** (0.175)  (22.287) (21.392) (0.544) 
people without children 0-15 -36.347 -12.639 -0.509  -32.445 4.071 -0.736 
 (6.681)*** (7.876) (0.166)*** 
 
 (17.284)* (18.936) (0.543) 
-4.828 19.610 -0.078  6.300 13.450 -0.199 children 0-15 in household 
dummy (2.950) (4.732)*** (0.095)  (8.439) (8.310) (0.121) 
-0.284 17.967   17.384 18.498  no 0-15 children in household 
dummy (3.810) (4.668)***   (6.291)** (5.989)***  
unemployment rate -0.269 0.194 -0.014  -0.340 0.226 -0.016 
 (0.101)** (0.110) (0.002)***  (0.224) (0.293) (0.005)*** 
union density 0.069 0.057 -0.001  0.091 0.039 -0.001 
 (0.014)*** (0.020)** (0.000)***  (0.047)* (0.055) (0.001) 
employment protection 0.438 1.679 -0.015  -0.507 -0.197 -0.014 
 (1.431) (1.491) (0.041)  (4.423) (4.998) (0.097) 
age 2.523 1.329 0.071  1.084 0.888 0.046 
 (0.113)*** (0.181)*** (0.012)***  (0.195)*** (0.191)*** (0.014)*** 
age^2 -0.030 -0.015 -0.001  -0.015 -0.011 -0.001 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.000)***  (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.000)*** 
Observations 387446 274219 393390  422790 232594 429315 
R-squared 0.75 0.94   0.56 0.90  
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by countries). There are 13 clusters (countries) in each regression.  
+
 Marginal effects reported (evaluated at the mean of the independent variables), in case of dummy variables effects are 
computed for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%.  
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Table 13: Time spent in childcare at home for people with and without children, sample of 
age 16 and more (year 2000) 
Country 
Children 
(0-15) 
present 
No children 
(0-15) 
present Difference 
Austria            18.4               0.9         17.5  
Belgium            21.9               1.9         20.1  
Denmark            31.4               0.7         30.7  
Finland            19.4               0.8         18.6  
France            16.8               0.7         16.1  
Greece            17.7               1.7         16.0  
Ireland            29.0               1.1         27.9  
Italy            18.9               3.2         15.7  
Netherlands            31.1               2.3         28.9  
Portugal            13.9               0.9         13.0  
Spain            18.3               0.7         17.5  
Average            21.5               1.4         20.2  
Data Sources: ECHP. Time spent in childcare is based on ECHP variable pr007: Number of hours (per week) spent 
looking after children. This variable is based on two related survey questions: “Do your present daily activities 
include looking after children, whether your own or other, without pay?” and if the answer to this question is yes, 
“Roughly how many hours per week do you spend looking after children?” This variable is reported for those who 
did spend some time looking after children. For the rest (if applicable) I assumed they spend 0 hours looking after 
children.  
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Table 14: Childcare at home and family policy for people with and without children: 
regressions on the sample of age over 16 (1998-2001) 
Dependent variable: Hours per week looking after children 
Sample: all all all all males females 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Effects of childcare subsidies 
aggregate 2.189 0.719     
 (0.922)** (0.543)     
people with children 0-15   9.523 7.705 9.533 5.819 
   (2.324)*** (1.719)*** (1.036)*** (2.501)** 
people without children 0-15   -1.018 -2.790 -1.465 -4.044 
   (0.498)* 
 
(0.708)*** (0.567)** (0.910)*** 
Effects of family cash benefits 
aggregate -0.434 -1.022     
 (0.645) (0.449)*     
people with children 0-15   -0.254 -1.034 -0.861 -1.339 
   (1.618) (1.290) (0.879) (1.878) 
people without children 0-15   -0.492 -1.118 -0.493 -1.650 
   (0.414) 
 
(0.449)** (0.386) (0.587)** 
Effects of tax wedge 
aggregate -11.019 -5.962     
 (13.376) (5.060)     
people with children 0-15   -54.434 -50.417 -33.063 -63.657 
   (38.202) (27.113) (18.205) (37.790) 
people without children 0-15   9.941 17.262 3.931 27.329 
   (8.893) 
 
(6.808)** (4.459) (10.927)** 
  29.152 40.080 18.175 58.554 children 0-15 in household 
dummy   (16.264) (12.735)** (8.112)* (18.421)** 
  -10.237 -1.278 0.300 -3.061 no 0-15 children in household 
dummy   (4.570)* (4.161) (2.122) (6.865) 
unemployment rate  -0.052  -0.054 -0.053 -0.026 
  (0.057)  (0.070) (0.038) (0.106) 
union density  -0.026  -0.030 0.006 -0.062 
  (0.019)  (0.016)* (0.007) (0.026)** 
employment protection  -8.152  -10.034 -5.285 -14.917 
  (1.026)***  (1.373)*** (0.880)*** (2.032)*** 
age 0.639 0.636 0.431 0.424 0.236 0.656 
 (0.107)*** (0.112)*** (0.097)*** (0.102)*** (0.041)*** (0.166)*** 
age^2 -0.008 -0.008 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.007 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.002)*** 
Constant 2.075 10.190     
 (6.346) (4.004)**     
Observations 333447 314620 333385 314558 151885 162673 
No. of clusters/countries 10 9 10 9 9 9 
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.38 0.39 0.32 0.52 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by countries); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 15: Childcare at home and family policy for people with and without children: 
regressions on the samples of age 16-55 and over 55 (1998-2001) 
Dependent variable: Hours per week looking after children 
Age group: 16-55  >55 
 (1) (2)  (3) 
Effects of childcare subsidies 
aggregate 1.942   -1.875 
 (0.584)**   (0.327)*** 
people with children 0-15  6.581   
  (1.373)***   
people without children 0-15  -2.769   
  (0.896)** 
 
  
Effects of family cash benefits 
aggregate -0.953   -1.088 
 (0.479)*   (0.263)*** 
people with children 0-15  -1.381   
  (1.080)   
people without children 0-15  -0.888   
  (0.616) 
 
  
Effects of tax wedge 
aggregate -22.950   23.768 
 (5.586)***   (2.818)*** 
people with children 0-15  -54.580   
  (21.538)**   
people without children 0-15  7.074   
  (8.207) 
 
  
children 0-15 in household dummy  15.526   
  (9.572)   
 -24.102   no 0-15 children in household dummy 
 (6.934)***   
unemployment rate 0.019 0.008  -0.123 
 (0.064) (0.072)  (0.031)*** 
union density -0.012 -0.020  -0.019 
 (0.021) (0.016)  (0.011) 
employment protection -9.819 -12.289  -1.193 
 (1.087)*** (1.358)***  (0.618)* 
age 4.062 2.215  -0.083 
 (0.404)*** (0.217)***  (0.060) 
age^2 -0.056 -0.030  -0.000 
 (0.006)*** (0.003)***  (0.000) 
Constant -38.294   3.443 
 (6.266)***   (2.353) 
Observations 217131 217077  97489 
R-squared 0.10 0.42  0.03 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by countries). There are 9 clusters (countries) in each 
regression. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 16: Measures of “culture” across countries: Incidence of part-time work and the 
average number of adults in the household (2000) 
Country 
% of part-time 
workers 
average number of 
adults in household 
(>18) 
Austria 13.2 2.0 
Belgium 15.5 2.0 
Denmark 15.3 1.9 
Finland 9.7 1.7 
France 8.9 2.0 
Germany 16.9 1.9 
Greece 5.5 2.3 
Ireland 19.1 2.3 
Italy 6.9 2.3 
Luxembourg na 1.9 
Netherlands 31.2 1.8 
Portugal 7.8 2.5 
Spain 8.9 2.6 
Sweden 9.0 1.6 
UK 10.0 1.8 
US 17.5 1.9 
Average 13.0 2.0 
Data Sources: ECHP and IPUMS CPS (King et. al. (2004)). 
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Table 17: Impact of “culture” – the average number of adults in the household and the 
incidence of part-time work:  Working hours regressions on the sample of age over 16 
(1998-2001) 
Dependent variable: Working hours per week Employed 
dummy 
 Working hours per week Employed 
dummy 
Sample: all employed all  all employed all 
 OLS Probit+  OLS Probit+ 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Effects of childcare subsidies        
aggregate 1.220 -1.142 0.135     
 (0.405)** (0.450)** (0.018)***     
people with children 0-15     0.975 -0.809 0.117 
     (0.764) (0.600) (0.031)*** 
people without children 0-15     1.208 -1.337 0.141 
     (0.405)** 
 
(0.483)** (0.023)*** 
Effects of family cash benefits        
aggregate -0.251 0.392 0.004     
 (0.392) (0.376) (0.011)     
people with children 0-15     -0.142 0.113 -0.003 
     (0.701) (0.513) (0.021) 
people without children 0-15     -0.442 0.574 0.004 
     (0.358) 
 
(0.345) (0.011) 
Effects of tax wedge        
aggregate -45.602 -14.183 -1.040     
 (10.289)*** (9.461) (0.278)***     
people with children 0-15     -28.710 -12.565 -0.630 
     (13.724)* (11.210) (0.331)* 
people without children 0-15     -52.186 -14.857 -1.210 
     (9.813)*** 
 
(9.546) (0.290)*** 
share of part-time workers -30.326 -28.809 -0.758  -30.512 -29.190 -0.767 
 (7.026)*** (4.790)*** (0.208)***  (7.229)*** (5.030)*** (0.214)*** 
-2.932 1.270 -0.180  -3.187 1.439 -0.186 average number of adults (>18) in 
household (1.148)** (1.003) (0.038)***  (1.197)** 
 
(1.049) (0.038)*** 
    17.493 20.906 -0.204 children 0-15 in household dummy 
    (6.875)** (6.523)*** (0.097)** 
    26.539 22.977  no 0-15 children in household dummy 
    (5.659)*** (5.378)***  
unemployment rate -0.410 0.041 -0.015  -0.412 0.029 -0.015 
 (0.052)*** (0.048) (0.001)***  (0.054)*** (0.050) (0.002)*** 
union density 0.082 0.039 -0.001  0.082 0.038 -0.001 
 (0.013)*** (0.012)*** (0.000)**  (0.014)*** (0.013)*** (0.000)* 
employment protection 2.181 0.698 0.092  2.127 0.625 0.090 
 (1.507) (1.218) (0.045)**  (1.579) (1.293) (0.046)* 
age 1.785 1.088 0.060  1.759 1.168 0.060 
 (0.149)*** (0.166)*** (0.014)***  (0.140)*** (0.178)*** (0.014)*** 
age^2 -0.022 -0.013 -0.001  -0.022 -0.014 -0.001 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.000)***  (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.000)*** 
Constant 23.001 23.696      
 (5.800)*** (5.387)***      
Observations 810698 507171 823200  810236 506813 822705 
R-squared 0.27 0.06 0.26  0.65 0.91 0.26 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by countries). There are 13 clusters (countries) in each regression. + Marginal effects 
reported (evaluated at the mean of the independent variables), in case of dummy variables effects are computed for discrete change of 
dummy variable from 0 to 1; z values in parentheses (test of the underlying coefficient being 0), * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 18: Impact of “culture” – the average number of adults in the household and the 
incidence of part-time work:  Childcare at home regressions on the sample of age over 16 
(1998-2001) 
Dependent variable: Hours per week looking after children 
Age group: 16-55  >55 
 (1) (2)  (3) 
Effects of childcare subsidies 
aggregate 2.210   -1.659 
 (0.351)***   (0.106)*** 
people with children 0-15  6.429   
  (1.184)***   
people without children 0-15  -2.941   
  (0.546)*** 
 
  
Effects of family cash benefits 
aggregate -0.317   -0.666 
 (0.228)   (0.085)*** 
people with children 0-15  -1.036   
  (0.884)   
people without children 0-15  -0.603   
  (0.503) 
 
  
Effects of tax wedge 
aggregate 2.943   38.828 
 (7.397)   (2.657)*** 
people with children 0-15  -20.228   
  (17.191)   
people without children 0-15  43.024   
  (12.158)*** 
 
  
share of part-time workers 27.399 36.989  15.975 
 (4.728)*** (4.370)***  (1.371)*** 
6.237 5.119  3.964 average number of adults (>18) in 
household (1.459)*** (1.219)*** 
 
 (0.426)*** 
children 0-15 in household dummy  -21.316   
  (7.281)**   
 -61.655   no 0-15 children in household dummy 
 (9.384)***   
unemployment rate 0.009 0.030  -0.132 
 (0.042) (0.040)  (0.013)*** 
union density 0.004 0.004  -0.011 
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.003)*** 
employment protection -7.330 -7.001  0.080 
 (1.069)*** (1.022)***  (0.259) 
age 4.055 2.198  -0.092 
 (0.405)*** (0.217)***  (0.063) 
age^2 -0.056 -0.030  -0.000 
 (0.006)*** (0.003)***  (0.000) 
Constant -70.510   -15.690 
 (9.103)***   (3.854)*** 
Observations 217131 217077  97489 
R-squared 0.11 0.42  0.03 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by countries). There are clusters (countries) in each regression. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Figure 1: Working hours per week per person 15-64 (year 2000) 
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Data sources: OECD data on total working hours. For more details see Table 1. 
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Figure 2: Working hours per week per person 16-64 from the micro data (year 2000) 
31.9
30.1 30.0 29.5 28.9 28.8 28.5
27.4 26.9
25.4 25.2 25.1 24.8
23.1 22.9
21.5
U
n
ite
d 
St
a
te
s
D
e
n
m
a
rk
Po
rtu
ga
l
U
n
ite
d 
Ki
n
gd
o
m
Au
st
ria
Sw
e
de
n
Fi
n
la
n
d
Lu
xe
m
bo
u
rg
Ge
rm
a
n
y
Be
lg
iu
m
N
e
th
e
rla
n
ds
Ire
la
n
d
Gr
e
e
ce
Fr
a
n
ce
Sp
a
in
Ita
ly
W
or
ki
ng
 
ho
u
rs
 
pe
r 
w
ee
k
 
Data Sources: European data is from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). As a measure of working 
hours I use the variable pe005: Total number of hours worked per week (in main + additional jobs). This variable is 
based on the following two survey questions:  “How many hours per week do you work in your main job, including 
paid overtime if any?” and “About how many hours per week did you work in your additional job or business? 
Please give an average figure for the last 4 working weeks.” It is only reported for individuals active in the labour 
market, hence for the rest I assume that they work 0 hours. The US data is from the US March Current Population 
Survey (CPS) from IPUMS CPS (King et. al. (2004)). For the US I use variable UHRSWORK: Usual hours worked 
per week (last year). It reports the number of hours per week that respondents usually worked if they worked during 
the previous calendar year. Individuals were asked this question if they reported working at a job or business at any 
time during the previous year or if they acknowledged doing "any temporary, part-time, or seasonal work even for a 
few days" during the previous year. Data is for the year 2000 (wave 7 of the ECHP). 
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Data sources: OECD Social Expenditure database (SOCX 1980-2003) and OECD Family Database (PF1). 
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Figure 4: Family cash benefits, % in GDP (year 2000) 
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Data sources: OECD Social Expenditure database (SOCX 1980-2003) and OECD Family Database (PF1). 
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Figure 5: Childcare subsidies and family cash benefits, % in GDP (year 2000) 
 
Data sources: OECD Social Expenditure database (SOCX 1980-2003) and OECD Family Database (PF1). There is a 
positive correlation (0.21), not significantly different from zero. 
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Figure 6: Childcare subsidies (% in GDP) and tax wedge (year 2000) 
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Data sources: OECD Social Expenditure database (SOCX 1980-2003) and OECD Family Database (PF1). Taxes are 
obtained from the CEP-OECD dataset, described in William Nickell (2006). There is a statistically significant 
positive correlation (0.66). 
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Figure 7: Family cash benefits (% in GDP) and tax wedge (year 2000) 
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Data sources: OECD Social Expenditure database (SOCX 1980-2003) and OECD Family Database (PF1). Taxes are 
obtained from the CEP-OECD dataset, described in William Nickell (2006). There is a positive correlation (0.26), 
not significantly different from zero. 
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Figure 8: Use of formal childcare and childcare subsidies (% in GDP) 
 
Data sources: OECD Family Database, ECHP (European Community Household Panel) and OECD Social 
Expenditure database (SOCX 1980-2003). For more details see notes under Table 3. 
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Appendix 
Here I show some results from the Section 2 analytically.  
First order conditions 
For completeness I state first order conditions for maximising utility subject to specified 
constraints. 
Parents FOC (based on equations (1) – (4)): 
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Nonparents FOC (based on equations (5) – (8)): 
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The effects of taxes on labour supply  
Aggregate labour supply and labour supply of parents unambiguously decrease with taxes: 
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For labour supply of nonparents: 
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Under plausible conditions, s and δ are much smaller than 1, hence this condition will be 
satisfied. See “Realistic example” below. 
The effects on childcare at home 
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Childcare from FOC: 
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Effects of taxes on childcare: 
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The effect on childcare of nonparents is ambiguous, although again, in realistic cases, s should be 
much smaller than α and the condition for a positive sign would hold. 
“Realistic example” 
Suppose 4.0=α , 4.0=τ , 4.0=δ  and 0=g ; then 2857.0≈h . If government gives 10% of the 
GDP (deliberate overestimate) for family cash benefits then 0714.0=s . Then both conditions 
above hold by a wide margin. One can think of an exhaustive range of “realistic examples” 
where the above conditions would always hold. 
Alternative set up for the government subsidy g with the market for childcare 
Alternatively, utility maximisation problem of parents could look like this: 
P
h
P
m
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PPP Hhl −−= 1 , 
where C represents the “amount” of childcare that parents buy on the market and ρ determines 
the elasticity of substitution between childcare at home and childcare provided on the market. In 
this set up, government pays for a share g of the childcare C that household buys on the market. 
Government hence implicitly reduces the price of childcare on the market relative to the self 
provision of childcare at home. 
Utility maximisation problem of nonparent households remains unchanged. 
Resulting in FOC for parents: 
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Closed-from solutions are complicated in this kind of set up. It turns out, however, that as long as 
market and domestically provided childcare are close substitutes (elasticity of substitution is 
greater than 1), which is plausible, the government subsidy g positively affects working hours h. 
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